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Environmental Justice and Title VI:
Making Recipient Agencies Justify
Their Siting Decisions
Bradford C. Mank*
ntle VI prohibits federal agencies from providing fonds to state or local agencies that
discriminate. Environmental justice advocates have filed over fzfty ntle VI complaints with the
EPA alleging that state or local environmental agencies have granted permits that will cause
disparate impacts against minority groups. In February 1998, the EPA promulgated an Interim
Guidance on ntle VI to help the agency resolve these complaints. A wide range ofstate and
local offiCials has criticized the Guidance because its vague definition of "disparate impact"
may give the EPA too much discretion to find discrimination. This Article demonstrates,
however, that the Guidance fails to provide sufficient protection far minority groups. First, EPA
should place the burden on recipient agencies to demonstrate that no less disCriminatory
alternative exists that is comparably effective. Second, the recipient agency and permittee
should have the burden of showing that any proposed mitigation measures will be effective.
Third, the EPA or recipients should oifor technical assistance, including grants, to community
groups and complainants. Finally, EPA should encourage states to adopt procedures to
promote early and effective participation by minority and other groups to avoid controversies
that lead to Tztle VI complaints.
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INTRODUCTION: TrrLE VI AND ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination
by programs receiving federal financial assistance. l Under section
602 of the statute, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
promulgated regulations that prohibit recipients of agency funding
from engaging in actions that cause disparate impacts.2
The growth of the environmental justice movement has led the
EPA, environmentalists, state and local recipients, and industly to pay
greater attention to Title VI. On February 11, 1994, President Clinton
issued Executive Order 12,898, which requires federal agencies to
develop environmental justice strategies.3 Clinton simultaneously
issued a presidential directive on environmental justice, which requires
federal agencies that provide funding to recipients with programs
affecting human health or the environment to guarantee that their grant
recipients comply with Title VI.4
In February 1998, the EPA promulgated an Interim Guidance for
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits
(Interim Guidance) to address when siting decisions may violate the
statute.s While many commentators have criticized the Interim
Guidance's definition of what constitutes a "disparate impact,'06 much
less attention has been devoted to other portions of the Interim
Guidance. For instance, the Interim Guidance fails to clarify what is
an "equally effective" less discriminatory alternative, or what types of
mitigation can be used to justify an otherwise unacceptable project.1
This Article proposes several ways to improve the Interim
Guidance's ability to protect minority groups. First, and most
importantly, the burden should certainly be on the recipient agency to
demonstrate that no less discriminatory alternatives exist that meet the
1.

2.
3.

See Civil Rights Actofl964 §§ 601-605,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1997).
See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
See Exec. Order 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859-60 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321

(1997).
4.
See Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 279,
280 (Feb. 11, 1994).
5.
See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR
lNvEsTiGATING TrrLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (Feb. 5,
1998) (visited Nov. 21, 1998) <http://es.epagov/oecaloejltitlevi.htm1> [hereinafter EPA,
INTERIM GUIDANCE].
6.
See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Comments on Title VI Guidance Seek
Clearer DefinitiOns, Input from More Parties, Daily Env't L. Rep. (BNA), at B-1 (May 15,
1998) (reporting that public commentators have criticized the Interim Guidance for failing to
define terms "disparate impact" or "mitigation"); David Mastio, Green Monster, 50 NAT'L
REv., July 6, 1998, at 22 (arguing that the Interim Guidance fails to define terms "disparate
impact" or "impacted community'').
7.
See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 11-12.
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applicant's reasonable business needs. The Interim Guidance's
requirement that an alternative be "equally effective"s makes it too
easy for a pennitting agency and pennittee to use minor advantages to
prefer their proposal to a reasonably effective less discriminatory
alternative. Second, the pennitting agency and pennittee should have
the burden of establishing that any mitigation measures used to reduce
disparate impacts to an acceptable level will in fact work and reduce
any risks to surrounding popUlations, including minority groups
protected by Title VI, to pennissible levels. Moreover, the pennitting
agency and pennittee should have the burden of examining whether
such mitigation measures could themselves be used as less
discriminatory alternatives that meet the applicant's reasonable
business needs. Third, the EPA or recipients should offer technical
assistance to Title VI complainants and should also provide Technical
Assistance Grants (TAGs), so that complainants can hire their own
technical experts. Fourth, recipients should adopt procedures to
encourage early participation by affected populations, especially
minority groups, to avoid controversies that lead to Title VI
challenges. These amendments should protect minority and lowincome popUlations, while allowing state or local pennitting agencies
and pennit applicants a reasonable opportunity to site needed facilities.
Part II examines whether minorities are disproportionately
affected by pollution and briefly discusses the EPA's response to
environmental justice issues. Part ill provides an introduction to Title
VI, the EPA's section 602 regulations and the EPA's efforts to enforce
Title VI. Part IV discusses the burden of proof under existing Title VI
and VII law. Part V reviews the Interim Guidance, and proposes four
significant ways to improve it.
.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF ''ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE"

A.

Empirical Evidence

Several studies provide evidence that minority and low-income
groups are exposed to disproportionate environmental risks.9 While
8.
Seeid.
9.
See CoMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHuRCH OF CHruST, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) (involving the location of all 415
commercial hazardous waste facilities in the contiguous United States that could be identified
through the EPA's Hazardous Waste Data Management System, using zip code areas to
derme minority and nonminority areas, and concluding that "[a]lthough socia-economic
status appeared to play an important role in the location of commercial hazardous waste
facilities, race still proved to be more significant''); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA
FmoN, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE REVISITED: AN UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT ON THE
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it may be understandable that developers would locate polluting
facilities in areas where land is inexpensive and, consequently, where
poor people are more likely to live, environmental justice has
become a contentious political issue because studies show that such
undesirable land uses are more likely to be located in areas with
higher minority populations, even if the study controls for income
levels. Some studies, however, have found no statistically significant
difference in the percentage of minority popUlations living in areas
with commercial hazardous waste facilities. 10 It is difficult to decide

RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CIiARACfERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAzARDous WA'5fE
SITES (1994) (relying on zip code areas to find that the location of hazardous waste facilities
reflects a national pattern of racial inequality that has gotten worse during the past decade);
Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A
Longitudinal Analysis ojEnvironmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,9, 19-27,33-34
(1997) (examining 544 communities, using 1990 census data, that hosted active commercial
hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities and finding no substantial evidence
that commercial hazardous waste facilities that began operating between 1970 and 1990 were
sited in areas that had disproportionate African-American or low-income populations, but
finding evidence that Hispanics were disproportionately more likely to live near such
facilities); 1 Tom Boer et aI., Is There Environmental Racism? The Demographics oj
Hazardous Waste in Los Angeles County, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 793 (1997) (finding that working
class communities of color in industrial areas of Los Angeles are most affected by hazardous
waste treatment storage and disposal facilities); Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste and the Black
Houston Community, 53 Soc. INQUIRY 273, 279-83 (1983) (finding that although AfricanAmericans made up only 28% of the Houston popUlation in 1980, 6 of Houston's 8
incinerators and mini-incinerators and 15 of 17 landfills were located in predominantly
African-American neighborhoods); Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and
Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OIllO
ST. L.1 329, 334-41 (1995) [hereinafter Mank, Environmental Justice] (summarizing studies
finding that racial minorities and low-income persons live near pollution to a disproportionate
extent); Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the Distribution ojEnvironmental Risk: The Case oj
TRI Facilities, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 811 (1997) (fmding that Toxic Release Inventory facilities and
pollutants are concentrated in residential zip codes with large minority populations); see also
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIRCED-83-168, SITING OF HAzARDous WA'5fE
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING
COMMUNITIES (1983) (examining racial and socioeconomic characteristics of the
communities surrounding four offsite hazardous waste landfills located in the eight
southeastern states that make up the EPA's region N and finding that "[b]lacks make up the
majority of the population in three of the four communities where the landfills are located").
10. Studies fmding no racial disparities are often based on census tract data as
opposed to those based on zip code areas. See generally Andy B. Anderson et aI.,
Environmental Equity: Evaluating TSDF Siting Over the Past Two Decades, WA'5fE AGE,
July 1994, at 83 (reporting analysis based on 1990 census data); Douglas L. Anderton et aI.,
Environmental Equity: The Demographics oj Dumping, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 229 (1994)
(reporting analysis based on 1980 census data); James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social
Costs: Estimating the Impact oJCollective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RAND J.
EcON. 101, 117-18 (1993); Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental
IneqUity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE 1 ON REG. 195, 203-04 (1997)
(using data from 1970, 1980 and 1990 censuses, and finding no statistical relationship
between active hazardous and solid waste storage facilities and incinerators and minority
HeinOnline -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 791 1998-1999
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which studies are more convincing, because they have employed
different definitions of what constitutes an affected minority
population. ll For example, a study based on the percentage of
minorities in the census tract surrounding a facility may come to a
different result than one based on the percentage of minorities in the
neighboring zip code areas, which are generally larger than census
tracts. 12 On the whole, there is credible evidence that minority
groups experience significant discrimination in some areas of the
country.13 At the very least, there is evidence that disproportionate
siting of polluting facilities occurs in some areas and that nationwide
policies are needed to prevent inequities in the future. 14

B.

The Political Debate

There has been an active political debate about the social
benefits of the environmental justice movement. Industry argues that
the economic benefits of its projects far outweigh risks, which
environmentalists frequently exaggerate. 1S Furthermore, industry
suggests that the environmental justice movement may effectively
discourage government officials from siting essential facilities that

residents in st. Louis, but finding a weak relationship between minority and poor residents
and facilities if inactive sites are added to the data set).
11. See generally Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 329, 343 n.59, 39092 & n.373 (discussing how use of different definitions of subpopulations or geographical
areas can dramatically affect research results); Paul Mohai, The Demographics ofDumping
Revisited: Examining the Impact of Alternate MethodolOgies in Environmental Justice
Research, 14 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 615 (1995) (same); Rae Zinunerrnan, Issues of Classification
in Environmental Equity: How We Manage Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ.
633,665-69 (1994) (same); infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
12. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Lond Uses in Minority Neighborhoods:
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1401 n.73, 1402-03 &
n.84 (1994) [hereinafter Been, Market Dynamics] (arguing that census tracts are more
reliable means to define conununity than zip code areas); Been & Gupta, supra note 9, at lO13 (citing sources and contending that census tracts are generally more reliable means to
defme conununity than zip code areas).
13. See Been & Gupta, supra note 9, at 9, 19-27, 33-34; Michael Fisher,
Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under TItle VI ofthe Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L.
285,299-301 (1995).
14. See supra note 13.
15. See Pollution in Minority and Inter-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on OverSight and Investigations, 105th Cong., Aug. 6, 1998, available in
1998 WL 12763210 (recording testimony of Harry C. Alford, President/CEO, National Black
Chamber of Conunerce, criticizing the EPA's environmental justice policies for discouraging
economic development in minority areas); CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS LAMBERT,
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, POLICY STUDY No. 121, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE? 6, 12-13 (1994) [hereinafter BOERNER & LAMBERT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?];
infra note 118 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 792 1998-1999

1999]

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI

793

would benefit minority and poor communities. 16 Environmentalists,
however, argue that environmental justice policies are essential to
protect the public health and environment of minority and lowincome communities.17

C.

The EPA s Response to Environmental Justice Issues

In 1990, during the Bush Administration, the EPA took its first
steps toward addressing environmental justice issues by creating an
EPA Environmental Equity Work Group, which issued a report in
1992 encouraging the agency to conduct further studies in this area. IS
Later that year, the EPA established an Office of Environmental
Equity (now the Office of Environmental Justice) to address these
issues. 19
Since 1993, the Clinton Administration has more aggressively
tackled the problem of environmental justice. President Clinton's
Executive Order 12,898 (Order) required all federal agencies to collect
data about the health and environmental impact of their policies on
minority groups and low-income popUlations and to develop policies
to avoid adverse impacts on these groupS.20 The Order also mandated
that every federal agency and department adopt environmental justice
strategies by February 11, 1995?1 The Order and these strategies are
16. See BOERNER & LAMBERT, ENvIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?, supra note 15, at 6, 12-13
(1994); Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REv. 75, 83-84, 10508 (1996) (arguing that environmental justice policies may discourage economic
development); Stephen C. Jones & Anoop G. Shroff, Environmental Justice Concerns Delay
Industrial Expansion, 13 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LmG. STRATEGY 1 (Oct. 1997) (same).
17. See Paul Stanton KibeI, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and
Justice, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 589, 607-09 (1997-98) (reporting proponents of
environmental justice are concerned that brownfie1ds redevelopment project will increase
health risks without providing many jobs in minority communities); Mank, Environmental
Justice, supra note 9, at 357-68 (arguing that risks of facilities may outweigh benefits);
Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice Perspective on Superfund Reauthorization, 9
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 565, 572 (1994); Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and
the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43
BUFF. L. REv. 285, 308-11 (1995).
18. See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, U.S. ENVIRONMENTALPR0TECI10N
AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008, REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNlTlES 2 (1997).
19. See James H. Colopy, Comment, The Road Less Traveled:
Pursuing
Environmental Justice Through TItle VI ofthe Civil Rights Act of1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
125, 185-86 (1994).
20. See Exec. Order 12,898, § 1-103,3 C.F.R. 859-60 (1994), reprinted in 42 U.S.c.
§ 4321 (1997).
21. See id. § 1-103(e). Federal Departments having fmal strategies for environmental
justice include: Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Interior, Justice, Labor,
Transportation, Health and Human Resources, and Housing and Urban Development; NASA
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also employ environmental justice
strategies. See Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice: Notification of
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not directly enforceable by private citizens through judicial action, but
depend on the good faith of federal officials to follow them. 22
President Clinton's Presidential Directive on Environmental Justice,
which accompanied the Order, emphasized that federal agencies
should use existing law to enforce the Order's goals, especially by
requiring their grant recipients to comply with Title VI.23
ill. TITLEVI
Because the EPA provides grants to almost all state and regional
siting or permitting agencies, Title VI clearly applies to these
agencies. 24 Before 1993, however, EPA did not actively enforce
compliance with Title VI by its grant recipients.25 In 1993, the EPA
began a new policy of enforcing Title VI, and in 1994, the agency
established an Office of Civil Rights to investigate Title VI
complaints brought by private citizens against recipients.26
A.

TItle VI Agencies May Prohibit Disparate Impacts

Under section 601 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
federal agencies and departments may not provide funding to
Availability of Final Federal Agency Environmental Justice Strategies, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,871
(1995).
22. See Bradford C. ManIc, Executive Order 12,898, in ENVlRONMENTAL JUSTICE
(Michael Gerrard ed.) (forthcoming 1999). Some federal administrative law judges,
however, have concluded that their agencies are bound to follow the Order and the agency's
environmental justice strategy. See id.
23. See Memorandum on Environmental Justice, 30 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 279,
280 (Feb. 11, 1994).
24. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice ": The Distributional
Effects ofEnvironmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 835-36 (1993) (reporting that in
1986 the federal government provided 46% of the funding for state air pollution programs,
33% of the funding for state water pollution programs, and 40% of the funding for state
hazardous waste programs); Colopy, supra note 19, at 129, 154-55. Some local
environmental agencies, however, are exempt from Title VI because they receive no federal
funding. See Colopy, supra note 19, at 173.
25. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 313-14; Lazarus, supra note 24, at 836-38
(discussing the EPA's decision to deemphasize its civil rights responsibilities under Title VI);
Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact
Test and Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Citing Decisions, 19 COLUM. 1. ENvn.. L.
211,228 (1994) (arguing that the EPA's stance that its decisionmaking was exempt from Title
VI-"lacks support from any internal policy or legal precedent"); Colopy, supra note 19, at
180-88 (discussing history of the EPA's enforcement of its Title VI regulations from 1975 to
1993). During that time period, some federal agencies brought Title VI actions. See, e.g.,
North Carolina Dep't ofTransp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6,9(1986).
26. See Natalie M. Hammer, Comment, TItle VI as a Means of Achieving
Environmental Justice, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 693, 711 (1996). In 1997, the agency also
added a new civil rights legal division within the agency's Office of General Counsel to focus
exclusively on these issues. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ALERT 31 (Dec. 31, 1997).
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programs that discriminate on the basis of race.27 The United States
Supreme Court has required proof of intentional discrimination
before allowing compensatory damages under section 601 of Title

VI?8
Section 602 of the statute requires every federal agency or
department to promulgate regulations that specify how the agency will
detennine whether grant applicants or recipients are engaging in
racially discriminatory practices and also to provide a process for
investigating and reviewing complaints of racial discrimination filed
with the agency?9 Beginning when the statute was enacted in 1964,
ahnost all federal agencies have adopted Title VI regulations
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination?O
Courts have
acknowledged the authority of agencies under section 602 of the
statute to issue regulations forbidding recipients from engaging in
actions causing disparate impact discrimination.31
The EPA's section 602 regulations forbid recipients from creating
disparate impacts: "A recipient [of federal funds] shall not use criteria
27. See Civil Rights Act of1964 §§ 601-605,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1997). Section 601
of the statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Id. § 601.
28. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 & n.2 (1983).
Justices White and Marshall each maintained that showing disparate impacts was sufficient to
prove a violation under section 601. See id. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (White, 1., announcing the
judgment of the Court); id. at 615,623 (Marshall, 1., dissenting).
29. See § 602. The statute provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section 601 with respect to such program or activity by
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
Id.
30. See Guardians,463 U.S. at 592 n.13; Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating ntle VI:
Defending Health Care Discrimination-It Shouldn t Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939,
947-48 (1990) (discussing how presidential task force helped agencies develop similar
disparate impact regulations under Title Vl).
31. See, e.g., Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 ("The threshold issue before the Court is
whether the private plaintiffs in this case need to prove discriminatory intent to establish a
violation of Title VI ... and administrative implementing regulations promulgated
thereunder. I conclude, as do four other Justices, in separate opinions, that the Court of
Appeals erred in requiring proof of discriminatory intent.''); see also Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (''The [Guardians] Court held that actions having an unjustifiable
disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed to
implement the purposes of Title VI."); Lazarus, supra note 24, at 835; Colopy, supra note 19,
at 159-60.
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or methods of administering its program which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color,
[or] national origin ... .'>32 In addition, the agency's regulations
proscribe recipients from choosing or approving a facility in an area
where the plant will create discriminatory impacts that harm minority
or ethnic groups covered by the statute.33 Also, the EPA regulations
direct state recipients to establish compliance programs designed to
prevent discrimination by the state or any beneficiaries of grants issued
by the state.34 The Administrator of the EPA has authority under the
regulations to refuse, delay or discontinue agency funding to any
specific program or subprogram in which the agency has found
discrimination. However, as shown in Part B, it is difficult for the
agency to actually tenninate funding. 3s
B.

EPA s Investigation and Enforcement ofTItle VI Complaints

Part III.B will briefly discuss the EPA's process for investigating
Title VI complaints and sanctioning recipients that engage in
discrimination. The main issue is that the EPA's Title VI regulations
provide few rights for complainants, but many protections to
recipients. Understanding this unequal treatment is crucial to
grasping the arguments in Part V that recipients should generally
bear the burden of proof, that either the EPA or recipients should
provide technical assistance to complainants, and that recipients
should establish programs to encourage early participation in
permitting processes by a wide variety of groups, including minority
and ethnic groups protected under Title VI.
lt is relatively easy to file a Title VI complaint under EPA's
section 602 regulations. A complainant may submit a short letter
describing how a recipient is allegedly engaging in discriminatory
practices. 36 Fulfilling the minimum requirements for a complaint,
32. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997)."
33. See id. (prohibiting location of facility that has discriminatory effect). Several
other federal agencies have similar regulations forbidding siting or permitting actions by
recipient agencies that cause disparate impact See, e.g., 10 C.F.R § 4.l2(c) (l998) (Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13(d) (l998) (Dep't of Energy); 32 C.F.R.
§ 195.4(b)(I)(iii) (l997) (Dep't of Defense); 49 C.F.R § 21.5(b)(3) (1997) (Sec'y of
Transp.); 23 C.F.R § 200.5(f) (1998) (Fed. Highway Admin.).
34. See 28 C.F.R § 42.410 (1997).
35. See 40 C.F.R § 7.l30(b)(3)(iii), (4); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
36. See 40 C.F.R § 7.120; Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the
EPA: The BriefHistory ofAdministrative Complaints Under Iitle VI ofthe Civil Rights Act
of 1964,9 ENVTL. L. & LmG. 309, 314-15, 319 (1994); Hammer, supra note 26, at 710-11.
The EPA requires a complaint to be filed within 180 days of the last alleged discriminatory
action, but complainants may request a waiver of the 180 day time limit for good cause. See
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however, does not guarantee success. While legal or technical
expertise is not needed to file a basic complaint, a complainant may
need extensive technical assistance to understand complex
demographic and pollution data that is often crucial in detennining
whether discrimination has occurred.37
hritially, the EPA conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine whether the complaint states a valid c1aim.38 If it accepts a
complaint for investigation, the EPA conducts that investigation as the
agency sees fit, although it may occasionally consult with the
complainant as a COurtesy?9 There is no way for a complainant to
force the agency to expedite its investigation or reach a decision.40 If
the Office of Civil Rights concludes that the recipient did not violate
the agency's Title VI regulations, then the agency will dismiss the
complaint.41 It is almost impossible for a complainant to challenge the
agency's dismissal of a complaint under either Title VI42 or the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).43
A complainant's limited rights to participate in the agency's
investigation and to appeal a dismissal are significant problems
because the agency dismisses many Title VI complainants.44 The EPA
has never yet found a violation under Title VI against a recipient.4s
On the other hand, recipients have substantial rights to challenge
the agency's investigation and findings if the EPA finds a Title VI
violation and seeks to impose sanctions, including termination of
40 C.F.R. § 7.120(b)(2); see also EPA, INrEruM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 7-8 (explaining
that the EPA might waive 180 day time limit for "good cause" if complaint was delayed
because the complainants were exhausting the recipient's administrative remedies).
37. See infra Part V.
38. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(l).
39. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706 n.41 (1979); Cole, supra
note 36, at 321-23; Fisher, supra note 13, at316; Colopy, supra note 19, at 167.
40. See Cole, supra note 36, at 321-22; Hammer, supra note 26, at 711.
41. See 40 c.F.R. § 7.120(g).
42. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 715 (suggesting that Title VI generally does not allow
private suits against the federal government); Fisher, supra note 13, at 317 n.158.
43. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 317 n.158; Colopy, supra note 19, at 168-69. A
Title VI or APA suit against a federal agency might be permissible if the plaintiff charges the
funding agency itself with discrimination, or with encouraging a recipient's discrimination.
See Fisher, supra note 13, at 317 n.158.
44. See Paul Connolly, Environmental Justice: Mayors Rap EPA at Meeting with
Browner for Failure to Consult on Interim Guidance, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 658 (July 24,
1998) (noting that as of July 1998, EPA had rejected a significant number of the complaints
filed with the agency); Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Pennits Cited in Civil Rights
Complaints Have Remained Valid, EPA Official Says, 152 Daily Env't L. Rep. (BNA) Aug.
7, 1998, at A-9 (same) [hereinafter Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid].
45. See Julie R. Domike & Arthur W. Ray, EPA, Courts Focus on ntle VI Issues in
Locating Industrial Plants in Low-Income Areas, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 1, 1997, at Cl; Hogue,
Pennits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9; Hammer, supra note 26, at 712-13.
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funding. A recipient may appeal an adverse finding to an EPA
administrative law judge (ALJ),46 then the EPA Administrator,47 and
finally to an Article III federal COurt.48 In addition, the EPA cannot
discontinue funding to a recipient until thirty days after it sends a full
report to Congress.49 Because of these lengthy appeals processes,
federal agencies rarely even attempt to terminate funding to a recipient
that has engaged in discrimination, but simply require the recipient to
avoid discriminatory practices in the future. 50 The EPA has never
formally terminated funding to any recipient.51
The EPA's administrative process for investigating Title VI
complainants and enforcing the statute provides little assistance to
complainants and makes it difficult to punish recipients that engage in
discrimination.
The EPA should give complainants a greater
opportunity to participate in investigations and the right to appeal
dismissals at least to an agency administrative law judge.52 Limited
procedural reforms, however, would not redress the fundamental
imbalance of resources between complainants, who are often poor, and
the typical state agency, which generally has a significant professional
staff and a fairly large budget, especially compared to community
organizations. Part V proposes a more ambitious plan to provide
complainants with a reasonable opportunity to investigate their claims
and to place an appropriate burden on recipients to justify their actions.

rv.

BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER TITLES VI AND VII

While section 601 of Title VI only reaches intentional
discrimination, agency regulations under section 602, including the
EPA's, address recipient practices that cause disparate impacts
against protected minority groupS.53 This Article will focus solely on
the standard for proving disparate impacts and will not address the
somewhat different issues raised by disparate treatment suits
involving intentional discrimination. No reported Title VI cases have
addressed environmental justice challenges, but some Title VI
decisions involving the siting of public facilities are helpful in
understanding a plaintiff's burden of proof and what defenses a
46. See 40 C.ER § 7.130(b)(2) (1997).
47. See id. § 7.l30(b)(3).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1997).
49. See id. § 2000d-l; 40 C.ER § 7.130(b)(3)(iii).
50. See Colopy, supra note 19, at 155.
51. See Dornike & Ray, supra note 45, at CIS.
52. Arguably, allowing a complainant to appeal dismissals to the Administrator of the
EPA or to a federal court would be too costly.
53. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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defendant might raise. 54 Furthennore, employment discrimination
cases provide some insights, but Title VII's restrictive evidentiary
standards are often inappropriate for Title VI challenges involving
recipients who have voluntarily accepted federal grants.55 Part IV
will focus on when a defendant may use business necessity to justify
otherwise inappropriate disparate impacts, and when a plaintiff may
demonstrate that a defendant failed to adopt a less discriminatory
alternative.
A.

Establishing a Prima Facie Case ofDisparate Impacts

A plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving a prima facie
case. 56 A Title VII plaintiff must prove three elements in a prima
facie case: (1) identify the specific employment practice that is being
challenged, (2) show that the practice has a disproportionate impact
on persons protected by the statute, and (3) demonstrate that the
identified practice is the cause in fact of the alleged discrimination.57
Title VI plaintiffs must prove the same second and third elements,
but may not have to identify discriminatory practices with as much
particularity as Title VII plaintiffs.
First, a civil rights plaintiff must, to the extent possible, identify
which practices or actions of a defendant are the source of
discriminatory effects. Title VII, as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, specifies that a plaintiff must "demonstrate that each particular
challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact," unless the
plaintiff can establish ''that the elements of a respondent's

54. See, e.g., NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1334 (3d Cir.
1981) (en banc) (challenging hospital relocation in Title VI suit); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d
612,618-19 (2d Cir. 1980) (challenging the decision to close a municipal hospital in a Title
VI action); Bryant v. New Jersey Dep't ofTransp., 998 F. Supp. 438 (D.N.I 1998) (finding
that plaintiffs had standing under Title VI, but not ruling on merits of claim that state
highway department's location of highway was discrimination in violation of Title VI);
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (challenging state highway department's location of highway in Title VI suit); S.
Watson, supra note 30, at 966-71 (discussing Title VI suits challenging hospital closings and
relocations).
55. See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text
56. See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact:
Doctrinal
Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47
EMORyL.J. 409, 422-23 (1998).
57. See EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066,48 F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir.
1995); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 423,459-63; Linda Lye, Comment, TItle VII's Tangled
Tale: The Erosion and Confusion ofDisparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense,
19 BERKELEY I EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 343 (1998).
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decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis."s8
It is not clear whether or to what extent the particularity requirement
applies to Title VI, but a plaintiff challenging a permitting agency's
siting criteria might have to identify which practices cause
. discrimination.S9
Second, civil rights plaintiffs must establish disparity by showing
that persons of a particular race, color, or national origin protected by
the statute are disproportionately included or excluded compared to a
relevant groUp.60 The primary issue is usually whether a plaintiff has
chosen an appropriate comparison groUp.61 For instance, a Title vn
plaintiff in an employment case must correlate the race of those
holding a particular type of employment with the pool of qualified job
applicants.62 Similarly, a Title VI plaintiff challenging the location of a
highway or hospital must compare the racial demographics of the site
Courts in employment
with appropriate alternative sites. 63
discrimination cases have sometimes rejected sophisticated statistical
models if either the minority populations or comparison groups
selected are under- or over-inclusive. 64
Finally, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove the
identified practice actually caused the disparate impact. 6S In Title vn
cases, courts usually require a plaintiff to prove causation through
statistical evidence that a particular employment practice causes a
"substantially" or "significantly" greater percentage of minorities to
58. 42 US.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(B)(i) (1997) (emphasis added); see also Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 US. 642, 656-57 (1989) (requiring plaintiff to show that specific
employment practice has caused disparate impacts); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
US. 977, 994-95 (1988) (plurality opinion) (requiring plaintiff to "isolat[e] and identif[y] the
specific" employment practices allegedly responsible for disparate impacts); MaiIoney, supra
note 56, at 423, 459-60.
59. See Vicki Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, in 4 PATRICK J. ROHAN,
ZONING AND LAND USE CoNTROLS § 25D.04[3][g][i], at 89 n.89 (1997) [hereinafter Been,
Equity Issues].
60. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406-07 (11th Cir.
1993); MaiIoney, supra note 56, at 423, 460-61; Daniel K. Hampton, Note, Title VI
Challenges by Private Parties to the Location ofHealth Care Facilities: Toward a Just and
EjJectiveAction, 37 B.G L. REv. 517, 530 (1996); Lye, supra note 57, at 343.
61. SeeMaiIoney.supranote56.at 423,461.
62. See Wards Cove, 490 US. at 650-51; MaiIoney, supra note 56, at 423,461; Lye,
supra note 57, at 343.
63. See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110,

127-28 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (comparing racial demographics of highway site with other
alternatives); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g][i], at 90-92.
64. See EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734,750-52 (S.D. Fla
1989); Lye, supra note 57, at 343-44 & n.148 (citing cases).
65. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407; MaiIoney, supra note 56, at 423, 462-63; Hampton,
supra note 60, at 530; Lye, supra note 57, at 343.
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experience adverse results than an appropriate comparison groUp.66
Under Title VI, courts have also frequently inferred causation based on
statistical comparisons between minority host sites and the racial
demographics of neighborhoods that would have been suitable for the
facility.67
It is uncertain how much evidence a Title VI plaintiff needs to
establish that a recipient's decision to grant a permit to an industrial or
disposal facility will cause disparate impacts. Defining the relevant
affected population groups and comparison groups is more
complicated in an environmental siting case. Depending on the facts
in a particular case and type of pollution, the relevant population could
be those living within one mile of a facility, or several miles from the
site. There are even more complex problems in measuring the risks of
carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic pollutants.68

B.

Defendant's Burden ofProof

After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant
bears the burden of either rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie
evidence or showing the challenged practice is justified by business
or educational necessity.69 Because courts are often relatively lenient
in allowing a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, defendants
rarely rest their entire defense on disproving the plaintiff's evidence
and almost always try to prove their actions are justified by business

66. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988) (plurality
opinion); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 423, 462-63; see also Been, Equity Issues, supra note
59, § 25D.04[3][g][i], at 89-90.
67. See, e.g., Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 (discussing standard under Title VI for proving
causation); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1417 (11th Cir. 1985) (basing prima facie case on evidence that racial composition of local
defendant's classrooms differs from random distribution); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969,
982-83 (9th Cir. 1984) (basing prima facie case on evidence that percentage of AfricanAmerican children in "educable mentally retarded" classes was higher than their percentage
in school population as a whole); Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 127
(finding prima facie case where people of color represented between 50% and 90% of
neighborhoods in which proposed highway would be located); Been, Equity Issues, supra
note 59, § 25D.04[3][g][i], at 90-91; Terence J. Centner et aI., Environmental Justice and
Toxic Releases: Establishing Evidence of Discriminatory Effect Based on Race and Not
Income,3 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 139 (1996).
68. See generally Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A
Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562,584-616 (1992)
(arguing that comparative risk analysis has many limitations); Mank, Environmental Justice,
supra note 9, at 394-97 (same).
69. See Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact
Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 387, 394 (1996); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 424.
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necessity.70 It is sometimes possible, however, for a defendant to
rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case.7I
Before 1989, some Title VI and VII cases placed both the
burdens of production and persuasion on defendants once a plaintiff
established a prima facie case.72 Other lower court decisions, however,
held that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of
going forward shifts to the defendant, while the ultimate burden of
persuasion remains with the plaintiff.73 In 1989, the Supreme Court, in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, endorsed the latter approach.74
In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress rejected Wards Cove's
holding that the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with the
plaintiff, and placed both the burdens of production and persuasion on
the defendanes The 1991 Act explicitly amended Title VII to place
the burden of persuasion on the defendant ''to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity," unless the defendant has rebutted
the plaintiff's prima case by "demonstrat[ing] that a specific
employment practice does not cause the disparate impact.,,76 The 1991
Act does not apply to Title VI, but several commentators have
predicted that courts will place the burden of proof on Title VI
defendants either to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case or to justify
their actions. 77
70. See Mahoney, supra note 56, at 424,469-71.
71. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1412-13.
72. See Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 n.9 (holding burden of persuasion shifts to
defendant if plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of disparate impact); Georgia State
Conference,775 F.2d at 1417 (same); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at
87-88 n.85; Centner et aI., supra note 67, at 138-40; Fisher, supra note 13, at 320-21.
73. See NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en banc); Coalition of Concemed Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110,127
(S.D. Ohio 1984) (stating that, after defendant presents justification for actions, "[t]he
ultimate burden of proving illegal discrimination remains with plaintiffs"); Been, Equity
Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 87-88 n.85; Fisher, supra note 13, at 320-21.
74. 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989); see Mahoney, supra note 56, at 452-53.
75. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c.
§ 2000e-2(k) (1997)); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that 1991 Act places burden of persuasion regarding business necessity on
defendant in Title VII case); Fitzpatrickv. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 & n.5 (11th Cir.
1993) (same); Frazierv. Garrison Indep. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 1514, 1525 n.34 (5th Cir. 1993)
(same); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 87-88 n.85; Mahoney, supra
note 56, at 454-55; Lye, supra note 57, at 348.
76. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(i), (B)(ii) (1997). The
1991 Act defines "demonstrate" to require a defendant to "meetD the burdens of production
and persuasion." § 2000e(m).
77. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n.14 (11th Cir.
1993); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 87-88; Fisher, supra note 13, at
321; Paul K. Sonn, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded Construction
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In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., a unanimous Supreme Court held
that facially neutral educational requirements and testing practices
that had significant disproportionate impacts on African-Americans
violated Title VII unless the defendant could justify these practices
by proving ''business necessity" and a "manifest relationship" to its
legitimate interests.78 Subsequent cases are split as to how essential a
challenged practice must be to a defendanfs business. Some courts
have required that a practice not only advance, but be essential to, a
defendant's business.79 Other decisions have interpreted Griggs'
"manifest relationship" language merely to require a defendant to
demonstrate that a practice significantly or substantially advances its
legitimate goals.80 In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta,
Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE LJ. 1577, 1596-97 (1992);
Colopy, supra note 19, at 163-64. But cj Scelsa v. City Univ. ofN.Y., 806 F. Supp. 1126,
1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (fmding, albeit in dicta, that burden of persuasion in Title VI cases
remains at all times with plaintiff, but not referring to 1991 Act). Indeed, it could be argued
that a broad disparate impact approach is more suitable for the public funding issues relevant
to Title VI than to the private sphere of employment under Title VII. See Watson, supra note
30, at 971-75.
78. 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); see also Grover, supra note 69, at 389; Philip S.
Runkel, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Continuation ofthe Wards Cove Standard of
Business Necessity?, 35 WM. & MAR,yL. REv. 1177, 1182-83 (1994) (observing that Griggs
contains five different verbal formulations for how employer must justify disproportionate
impacts under Title VIl).
79. See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (noting that the
defendant's business must ''necessitateD'' the practice); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
331-32 (1977) (stating that defendant must prove that height and weight requirements are
"essential" to job performance); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 104142 (9th
Cir. 1988) (stating that the practice must be compelIing enough to override its discriminatory
effects), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 804 F.2d 682,
689 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the practice must be essential to its objectives); Williams v.
Colorado Springs, Colo. Sch. Dist No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (lOth Cir. 1981) (same);
Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); United States v. St.
Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (stating that the defendant's
practice must be "essential''); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d
Cir. 1971); see also Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 318, 343 (1987) (citing cases); Grover, supra note 69, at 389-90;
Pamela L. Perry, Balancing Equal Employment Opportunities with Employers' Legitimate
Discretion: The Business Necessity Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination Under
Title VII, 12 INDus. REL. L.J. 1, 11-17,25-28 & 49 nn.233-34 (1990) (discussing the law of
"business necessity" and citing cases). But cj Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact
Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1031 (1993)
(arguing that the Dothard decision "did not require that the criterion be necessary for the
business to survive or for the job to be done at all but rather that it be 'necessary' for the job
to be done well").
80. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979)
(referring with approval to the trial court's holding that the defendant's refusal to hire
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stated that a challenged practice need not "be 'essential' or
'mdispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster.,,81 It
is unclear whether the Court was endorsing prior case law following
the lesser "manifest relationship" approach, or adopting an even
more lenient approach. 82
The 1991 Civil Rights Act clearly rejected Wards Cove's lighter
burden on the employer to prove business necessity, but left many
questions unanswered about how essential the defendant's justification
must be. 83 The 1991 Act requires Title VII defendants ''to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question
An interpretive
and consistent with business necessity.,,84
memorandum in the legislative history provides that "[t]he tenns
'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to reflect the
concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.,,85 While explicitly repudiating Wards Cove,
the 1991 Act failed to address the problem that the Supreme Court's
decisions prior to that case were not consistent. 86
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not clearly set out how
necessary a practice must be or how the business necessity standard
relates to the issue of whether the defendant could adopt a less

methadone users was justified because its goals "are significantly served by-even if they do
not require--[that] rule"); GiIlespie v. Wisconsin, 771 F.2d 1035, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1985);
Contreras v. City ofL.A., 656 F.2d 1267, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981); Chrisner v. Complete Auto
Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Grover, supra note 69, at 390;
Peny, supra note 79, at 11-24, 50-53.
81. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). The Court
explained that "this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for most employers to
meet, and would result in a host of evils." Id.
82. See Peny, supra note 79, at 23-24,45-50; Watson, supra note 30, at 960-62.
83. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1997).
84. Id.; Elston v. Talledega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n.l4 (11 th Cir.
1993); Colopy, supra note 19, at 163-64.
85. 137 CONGo REc. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (citations omitted); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(C) (1997) (providing that plaintiffs' opportunity to demonstrate that a
de~endant failed to adopt an alternative practice with less discriminatory effect "shall be in
accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989 [the day before Wards Cove was
decided] with respect to the concept of 'alternative employment practice"'); Been, Equity
Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g][ii][B], at 97.
86.
Compare New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979)
(referring with approval to the trial court's holding that the defendant's refusal to hire
methadone users was justified because its goals "are significantly served by-even if they do
not require-[that] rule"), with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (noting
that the defendant must prove height and weight requirements are "necessary" to job
perfonnance). See also Grover, supra note 69, at 392-93; Mahoney, supra note 56, at 45556.
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discriminatory altemative.87 Since 1991, federal courts have applied at
least four different tests for determining the burden placed on
defendants under the business necessity standard:88 (1) compelling
necessity,89 (2) demonstrably necessary to meet an important business
goal,90 (3) reasonably necessary to meet an important business
objective,91 or (4) that the selection criteria bear a manifest relationship
to the employment and serve legitimate business goalS.92
One interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is that it
implicitly rejects some earlier decisions holding that Griggs' "manifest
relationship" language merely requires a defendant to demonstrate that
a practice significantly or substantially advances its legitimate goals,
and thereby makes it more difficult for defendants to prove business
necessity.93 The statute explicitly requires both business necessity and
job relatedness. The mandate that an employer demonstrate job
relatedness arguably tightens the business necessity standard by
demanding that a practice be necessary for the job at issue.94 If a
practice such as requiring a diploma merely serves the function of
making employees appear to be well educated to outsiders, but is not
essential to performing ajob, then the 1991 Act arguably prohibits that
type of practice.9S
Another possible interpretation is that the 1991 Act makes it
easier for defendants to prove business necessity because the statute
uses the term "consistent with" business necessity.96 While the 1991
87. See Grover, supra note 69, at 396-97.
88. See Lye, supra note 57, at 348-53.
89. See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., 7 F.3d 795, 797-99 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding 1991
Act places burden of showing "compelling need" regarding business necessity on defendant);
Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 895 F. Supp. 1536, 1545 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
(holding that 1991 Act places burden of showing "sufficiently compelling" business purpose
on defendant in Title VII case), aff'd, 85 F.3d 643 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Lye, supra note
57, at 349-50.
90. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding that 1991 Act places burden of showing "demonstrabl[e] necessity" regarding
business necessity on defendant in Title VII case); see also Lye, supra note 57, at 350-51.
91. See Donnelly v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp.
583,593 (D.RI. 1996) (stating that, to prove business necessity under 1991 Civil Rights Act,
the defendant must prove ''that the challenged practice is reasonably necessary to achieve an
important business objective"), aff'd, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Mahoney, supra
note 56, at 455-58 (arguing most courts since 1991 have followed Wards Cove's approach to
what is a "legitimate business justification"); id. at 472-73 (agreeing with Donnelly's relaxed
''reasonably necessary" interpretation of business necessity); Lye, supra note 57, at 351-52.
92. See Stenderv. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 321-22 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see
also Lye, supra note 57, at 352-53.
93. See Grover, supra note 69, at 396-97.
94. Seeid.
95. Seeid.
96. See supra note 91.
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Act clearly placed the burden of persuasion in proving business
necessity on defendants, some courts have suggested that the Wards
Cove and Watson decisions' more relaxed approach as to what
constitutes a legitimate business justification remains valid.97
Accordingly, in Donnelly v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for
Higher Education, the United States District Court of Rhode Island
held that a Title VII defendant must prove that a "challenged practice
is reasonably necessary to achieve an important business objective."98
2.

Types of Evidence that Constitute a Valid Business Justification

Title VII does not specify what type of evidence might
constitute a valid business justification for a challenged practice. 99 A
relaxed approach to proving business necessity is consistent with
earlier Title VII cases in which courts have allowed a defendant to
introduce evidence of significant cost savings, efficiency gains, or
safety considerations as justification for either business practices or
decisions having disparate impacts. 100 In both Wards Cove and the
earlier Watson plurality decision, the Supreme Court stated that
"[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens" of alternative practices
are legitimate justifications for disparate impacts. 101 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court and lower courts in some cases have recognized

97. See EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 601 n.6 (I st Cir.
1995) (concluding that Wards Cove remains good law except for portions explicitly rejected
by 1991 Civil Rights Act); see also Mahoney, supra note 56, at 455-58 & n.198, 472-73
(arguing most courts since 1991 have followed Wards Cove's approach to what denotes a
"legitimate business justification").
98. 929 F. Supp. 583,593 (D.R.1. 1996) (emphasis added), aff'd, lIO F.3d 2 (1st Cir.
1997); see also Mahoney, supra note 56, at 472-73 (applauding the careful analysis of
Donnelly's relaxed ''reasonably necessary" interpretation of business necessity).
99. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality
opinion) (stating that employers are not required to introduce formal validation studies
showing that their criteria actually predict on the job performance); see also Mahoney, supra
note 56, at 475.
100. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (permitting defendant to present evidence of cost
and other burdens in assessing whether plaintiff's proposed "less-discriminatory" altematives
meet defendant's legitimate business goals); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 587 n.31 (1979) (finding that safety and cost savings justify disparate impacts in Title
VII case); Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 570-71 (1978) (same); Brodin,
supra note 79, at 344-57 (citing cases). But see Brodin, supra note 79, at 353-54 & n.203
(criticizing cost-based defenses); Grover, supra note 69, at 398 n.40; Note, The Civil Rights
Act of1991 and Less Discriminatory Alternatives in Disparate Impact Litigation, 106 HARV.
L. REv. 1621, 1624-26 (1993) [hereinafter Note, Less Discriminatory Alternatives]
(contending that courts should reject cost based defenses in disparate impact litigation).
101. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) (quoting Watson,
487 U.S. at 998).
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defendants' concerns about safety as justifying disparate impacts on
employment decisions. ,o2
If courts adopt a strict necessity approach to proving business
necessity, defendants would have a greater burden in trying to use cost,
efficiency or safety justifications. A strict necessity approach would
be similar to Title VII cases involving disparate treatment of women
and intentional gender discrimination, where the Supreme Court has
generally rejected the defense of increased cost or reproductive safety
when raised as a bona fide occupational justification for either not
hiring women or for requiring them to contribute more to a pension
because they live longer than men. I03
3.

Title VI Prohibits Unjustified Disparate hnpacts

The EPA's Title VI regulations prohibit recipients from
engaging in any practices that cause discriminatory effects. 104 In
Title VI decisions involving other agencies, however, courts have
generally interpreted similar regulations to allow recipients to present
a defense of business or educational necessity as a justification for
practices causing disparate impacts. IDS I argue, in Part V.B.1, to limit,
but not eliminate, the ability of Title VI recipients to present such
defenses, by requiring them to adopt a less discriminatory alternative
unless it would cost significantly more or would be much less
efficient or safe.

102. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31 (fmding that safety concerns justify disparate
impacts in Title VII case); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-36 (1977) (same);
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112,1119-21 (11th Cir. 1993) (same).
103. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-211
(1991) (rejecting cost and safety as justification for not hiring women to lead exposed
positions because of risks to any potential fetus); City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 & n.32 (1978); see also Grover, supra note 69, at 398 n.40;
Note, Less Discriminatory Alternatives, supra note 100, at 1624-26.
104. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text
105. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d l394, 1412-l3 (11th Cir.
1993); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417-18
(I Ith Cir. 1985); NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d l322, l334 (3d Cir. 1981)
(en banc) (stating that "challenged practice must not only affect disproportionately, it must do
so unnecessarily"); Coalition of Concemed Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp.
110, 127 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("Defendants are not per se prohibited from locating a highway
where it will have differential impacts upon minorities. Rather, Title VI prohibits taking
actions with differential impacts without adequate justification."); Been, EqUity Issues, supra
note 59, § 25D.04[3][g], at 88 n.87; Fisher, supra note l3, at 321; Sonn, supra note 77, at
1598.
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Plaintiff's Demonstration ofAlternative Sites

Under Title vn, if a defendant presents a legitimate justification
for its behavior, the plaintiffbears the ultimate burdens of production
and persuasion to demonstrate either that the defendant's justification
is actually a pretext for a discriminatory purpose, or that the
defendant has refused to utilize an "alternative employment practice"
that would achieve its legitimate goals with less discriminatory
harm. 106 The 1991 Civil Rights Act codified the rule that the plaintiff
has the burden of demonstrating the existence of alternative
employment practices, and also specifies that a plaintiff may prevail
only if the defendant employer ''refuses to adopt such alternative
employment practice.,,107
Title vn law is less clear about the degree to which a plaintiff
must establish that an alternative is equally effective in addressing the
defendant's legitimate business needs. lOS In 1989, the Supreme Court
in Wards Cove followed Watson and held that plaintiffs must prove
that a less discriminatory alternative is equally effective: '''[fJactors
such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection
devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer's
legitimate business goals. ",109 While the 1991 Act clearly rejected
Wards Cove's holding that plaintiffs had the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of business necessity, the statute did not clearly
reject that decision's holding that plaintiffs must prove that a less
discriminatory alternative is equally effective. The 1991 Civil Rights
Act appeared to reject Wards Cove's approach to the issue of
alternative selection practices by stating that Title vn law on that issue
would return to what it had been one day prior to the Supreme Court's
decision. Unlike the issue of burden of proof for business necessity
for which only prior Supreme Court decisions were allowed to define
the law, the 1991 Act left standing as precedent prior lower court
decisions for defining the plaintiff's burden for establishing suitable
106. See 42 US.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(i) (1997); Albemarle Paper Co. Y. Moody, 422
US. 405, 425 (1975) (stating that, once the defendant presents a legitimate justification for its
behavior, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that "other tests or selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate
interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship"') (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. Y.
Green,411 US. 792, 802 (1973)); Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1117-19; see also Mahoney, supra
note 56, at 483-84.
107. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(ii); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 484.
108. See Mahoney, supra note 56, at 486-88.
109. Wards Cove Packing Co. Y. Atonio, 490 US. 642, 661 (1989) (quoting Watson Y.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 US. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
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alternatives, including many decisions that had followed the same
equally effective standard for alternatives as Wards Cove and
Watson. lIO Several recent cases have continued to follow Wards
Cove's requirement that plaintiffs prove that an alternative would be
equally effective, would have less disproportionate effect and would
not cost significantly more. 111 Other cases have employed the possibly
different standard that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a less
discriminatory alternative is "comparably effective."112
V.

EPNs "INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INvEsTIGATING TITLE VI
ADMINISTRATNE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS":
PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON PLAINTIFFS

As discussed above,l13 the EPA issued the Interim Guidance to
help the agency assess such complaints.1l4 Many commentators have
criticized the Interim Guidance because it only vaguely addresses
critical terms, such as what constitutes a "disparate impact."llS Most
commentators, however, have failed to examine other important
definitions in the Interim Guidance, including the extent to which
mitigation measures may compensate for disparate impacts, and the
circumstances under which an alternative should be considered
"equally effective."
I propose, in Part V.B, four major ways to improve the Interim
Guidance. 1I6 First, the EPA should place the burden on the recipient to
demonstrate that no less discriminatory alternative exists that would
meet the applicant's reasonable business needs. Second, the EPA
should require the recipient to establish that any proposed mitigation
measures will actually reduce any risks from the proposed facility to
permissible levels, and to examine whether such mitigation measures
110. See § 2000e-(2)(k)(I); see also Mahoney, supra note 56, at 486 n.298 (stating
that the 1991 Act reinstates only Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove on burden of
proof for business necessity, but reinstates all court decisions prior to Wards Cove on defming
altematives).
Ill. See York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948,955 (lOth Cir. 1996); MacPherson v. University
of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 771 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661);
Mahoney, supra note 56, at 486-89.
112. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118-19 (11th Cir. 1993)
(requiring the plaintiff to show that a less discriminatory, comparably effective altemative
exists). Part V.C.l.a will discuss the standard under Title VI for establishing that suitable less
discriminatory altematives exist. See infra Part V.C.1.a
113. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
114. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 20.
115. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
116. The EPA can emphasize that it will be less likely to fmd Title VI violations if a
recipient has adopted such procedures.
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could be used at alternative sites that could meet the applicant's
reasonable business needs with less discriminatory impacts. Third, the
EPA itself should furnish technical assistance and technical assistance
grants to Title VI complainants, or require recipients to do so. Finally,
the EPA should strongly encourage recipients to adopt procedures to
encourage early participation by affected populations, and especially
minority groups, to avoid controversies that lead to Title VI
challenges.
A.

Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative
Complaints Challenging Permits

1.

The EPA Issues the Interim Guidance and Promises to Revise It

Public commentary on the Interim Guidance has generally been
negative. Most commentators agree that the Interim Guidance only
vaguely defines crucial terms such as "disparate impacts.,,117
Furthermore, many state and local regulators and industry groups
have asked the EPA to rescind the Interim Guidance because they
fear that strict enforcement will discourage industry from building
new industrial facilities and creating jobs in minority areas.ll8
Congressional Republicans in the House of Representatives have
enacted legislation placing a moratorium on the agency from
accepting new Title VI complaints until it issues a final Title VI
guidance and held hearings to pressure the EPA to either rescind or
modify the Interim Guidance to make it less stringent and to allow
industry greater freedom to develop in minority areas. 119 Many
117. See Jeffrey B. Gracer, Taking Environmental Justice Claims Seriously, 28 ENVTL.
L. REP. (News & Analysis) 10,373, 10,375 (1998); Pollution in Minority and Inner-City
Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on OverSight and Investigations,
105th Cong., Aug. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12763021 (testimony of Michael Hogan,
New Jersey Dept of Environmental Protection, criticizing Interim Guidance for failing to
define "disparate impact," "community," or "mitigation''); Pollution in Minority and InnerCity Neighborhoods:
Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations, 105th Cong., Aug. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12763097 (testimony of
Barry McBee, Chainnan of Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, stating that
Texas shares concerns of other states that there are problems with Interim Guidance); supra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
118. See Environmental Council of States Resolution on EPA Interim Guidance for
Investigating Permit Challenges Approved March 26, 1998, 59 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) E-l
(Mar. 27, 1998); Environmental Justice: U.S. Conference of Mayors Calls on EPA to
Suspend Guidance on Civil Rights, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 469, 469 (June 26, 1998)
[hereinafter Conference ofMayors].
119. In October 1998, Congress enacted and President Clinton reluctantly signed an
appropriations bill that contains a rider prohibiting the EPA from accepting new Title VI
complaints after the date of its enactment until the agency issues a fmalized guidance on such
complaints; however, the legislation does not affect about 15 existing Title VI complaints.
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environmentalists, civil rights groups and minority members of
Congress, however, have cautiously defended the Interim Guidance
as a first step toward more stringent enforcement of the statute. 120
Because of broad public criticism, the EPA has promised to
revise the Interim Guidance and issue a final Interim Guidance in
1999.121 Both the EPA's advisory committee on Title VI and its
independent Science Advisory Board (SAB) will make
recommendations on how to improve the Interim Guidance before the
agency takes final action. 122
2.

Three Trouble Areas: Disparate Impacts, Mitigation, and
Alternatives

There are three major problems with the Interim Guidance.
First, it does not adequately explain how the agency will measure the
amount and harmfulness of pollution and decide which populations
will be affected by a facility, in detennining whether granting a
permit will cause significant disparate impacts. In particular, the
agency fails to provide a clear methodology for measuring the
cumulative burdens of all facilities impacting an affected population
See Veteran Affairs andHUD Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276,112 Stat. 2461, 2496
(1998); Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: With EPA as Judge, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at

FOI (stating appropriations bill bars EPA from accepting new Title VI complaints until
agency amends its policies); Bill Walsh, Law Puts EPA Bias Rule on Hold: Industry Targets
Racism Probes, NEW ORLEANS TIMEs-PICAYUNE, Oct. 23, 1998, at A8 (same); see also EPA
Will Limit Scope of Environmental Justice Investigations, ENvrL. POL'y ALEIIT, Dec. 2,
1998, at 7 (reporting Representative Tom BIiley's staff is investigating development of EPA's
Title VI policy).
120. See EPA Will Limit Scope, supra note 119, at 7 (reporting Congressional Black
Caucus favors EPA's Title VI policy). But see David Mastid, Caucus Opposes EPA Rule:
Rule Linking Pollution, Civil Rights 'Worst ofBoth Worlds, ' One Says, DETROIT NEWS, Dec.
4, 1998, at Bl (reporting National Black Caucus of State Legislators opposes EPA's Title VI
policy because it is too weak to protect minorities, but vague enough to stop job creation in
minority areas).
121. See Pollution in Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 105ili Cong., Aug. 6, 1998 (testimony of
Anne Goode, Director of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA); Connolly, supra note 44, at 658; Cheryl
Hogue, Draft Revision of Guidance for Processing Rights Camplaints Expected by Mid1999,29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1807, 1807 (Jan. 15, 1999) (reporting EPA willlikeIy issue a
draft revision of its Interim Guidance on Title VI complaints by mid-1999); Hogue, Pennits
Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9.
122. See Connolly, supra note 44, at 658; Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid,
supra note 44, at A-9; Cheryl Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps for EPA in Analyses of
Disproportionate Impacts, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1310, 1310-11 (Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter
Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps] (stating Science Advisory Board proposes iliat EPA conduct
disproportionate impact analysis in a step-by-step fashion); Amy Porter, Environmental
Justice: Agency Relying on Advisory Committee to Face State TItle VI Guidance Concerns,

28 Env'tRep. (BNA) 2690, 2690 (Apr. 17, 1998).
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group. Second, the Interim Guidance does not explain when and to
what extent mitigation measures may offset any disparate impacts.
Third, the Interim Guidance does not specify whether complainants
or recipients have the burden of proving that the recipient failed to
select a less discriminatory alternative and does not clarify what is an
"equally effective" alternative.

a

Measuring Disparate Impacts

The Interim Guidance does not adequately explain how the
agency will measure the amount and harmfulness of pollution, in
order to decide which populations will be affected by a facility. First,
the Interim Guidance,gives the agency considerable wiggle room by
indicating that the agency may use several different techniques in
assessing disparate impacts and then reach a final evaluation based
on the "totality of circumstances that each case presents."123 The
Interim Guidance does specify that the agency will usually undertake
a five step process in assessing whether a disparate impact exists. 124
The key to the five steps is identifying the "most affected population
groups" and facilities within the scope of the agency's cumulative
pollution burden analysis. 125 The Interim Guidance states that the
agency will usually examine not just the facility applying for a new
or renewed permit, but will evaluate the cumulative burden of both
existing and proposed facilities on "affected populations.,,126 The
EPA is more likely to find that disparate impacts exist if there are
already many polluting facilities in an area. 127
For the purposes of this Article, the crucial point is that a
cumulative burden analysis, which examines all the proposed and
existing facilities in a given area, is far more complex than simply
measuring the impact of a single facility. Not surprisingly, a state
official has strongly argued that the EPA should examine only the

123. EPA, INfERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 9.
124. See id. at 9-11. First, the agency must define the population groups that are most
greatly affected by a proposed or existing facility. Second, the agency conducts a
demographic Study of the most affected population groups. Third, the EPA must define
which facilities and populations are within the scope of its cumulative pollution burden
analysis. Fourth, the agency analyzes whether there are any disparate impacts by comparing
the racial or ethnic composition within the affected populations to altemative areas that could
have served as the site for the facility. Finally, the agency evaluates the statistical
significance of any disparities. See id.

125. Seeid.
126. Seeid. at9-11 &nn.12-l3.
127. Seeid. at IOn.l3.

HeinOnline -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 812 1998-1999

1999]

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI

813

emissions resulting from the permit under challenge. 128 That official
contends that existing emissions data is irrelevant in deciding whether
disparities result from the particular permitting decision at issue. 129
Environmentalists and civil rights advocates would usually prefer to
perform a cumulative burdens analysis because such an approach is
probably more likely to demonstrate disparities than looking at
emissions from a single facility applying for a permit. Nonetheless,
the result still depends on how the EPA defines the relevant population
groups and facilities in an analysis.
It is possible that the final Title VI interim guidance will provide
better and clearer definitions of crucial terms, including disparate
impacts, affected populations, and cumulative burdens.130 The SAB
has already recommended that the EPA examine not just whether
disparities exist between different population groups, but whether the
group at greater risk is exposed to an unacceptable level of risk. 131
This Article predicts that, while the EPA may improve its
definition of disparate impacts, affected populations, and cumulative
burdens, the agency will not be able to develop a single, easy method
for measuring any of these terms because there are too many complex
variables. No definition can avoid the very complexity of defining
disparate impacts, of defining and measuring the cumulative burdens
of pollution, and of assessing the appropriate demographic
populations.132 As discussed in Part II, studies have reached different
results about whether minority groups are disproportionately located
near industrial or disposal facilities because some studies, for instance,
have used census tracts as the unit of measurement, while others have
used zip code areas.133
It is crucial that both recipients and complainants have the
resources and technical expertise to challenge agency data, because
128. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Consider Only Emissions Due to
Permit Under Challenge. Louisiana Official Says, 173 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Sept. 8,
1998) [hereinafter Hogue, Consider Only Emissions] (discussing comments of Bliss Higgins

of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality).
129. Seeid.
130. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
131. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Advisers Recommending Some
Changes in Methodsfor TItle VI Complaint Analysis, 173 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Sept.
8, 1998); Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps, supra note 122, at 1311 (reporting Science

Advisory Board recommends EPA should determine the risk to all populations around a
facility, minority or not, before conducting a disproportionate impact analysis).
132. See generally Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 343 n.59, 390-92 &
n.373 (discussing how use of different definitions of subpopulations or geographical areas
can dramatically affect research results); Mohai, supra note 11, passim; Zimmerman, supra
note 11, at 665-69 (same).
133. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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one cannot assume that its demographic or pollution information is
accurate or complete. The EPA or recipient agencies should provide
technical assistance and funding to complainants so that affected
populations can understand the complex technical issues involved in
most Title VI environmental justice cases. 134
b.

Mitigation

If the EPA concludes that the recipient's action will result in
disparate impacts, the recipient agency that awarded the permit may
attempt to rebut the EPA's findings or contend that its action is
justified by the proposal's net benefits; however, the EPA encourages
measures that directly or indirectly mitigate any harms from such
disparate impacts as the primary approach to addressing Title VI
violations.I3S The EPA does not define when direct mitigation
measures or indirect "supplemental mitigation projects" are
appropriate to redress such harms, except to suggest that recipients
consult with the agency. 136
Civil rights groups are generally opposed to the EPA's policy of
allowing mitigation measures to offset harms from disparate impacts,
because they usually want to eliminate such impacts rather than to
either reduce them or authorize the agency to count indirect benefits
from supplemental environmental projects as compensation for such
harms. 137 ill Part V.B.2, I will demonstrate that the Interim Guidance
fails to provide guarantees that recipients or permit applicants will
actually implement promised mitigation measures. I will also examine
the Interim Guidance's requirement that the recipient determine
whether mitigation measures can serve as "less discriminatory
alternatives.,,138
c.

Less Discriminatory Alternatives

The Interim Guidance requires recipients to select a less
discriminatory alternative if it is "equally effective" in addressing the
permit applicant's goals, but fails to address how to evaluate
alternatives, or which party has the burden ?f proof to establish the

134. See infra Part V:B.3.
135. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 5, 11-12.
136. See id. at 11-12.
137. See Angela M. Baggetta, Environmental Justice: Black Caucus, EPA to Meet on
Shintech; Dispute May Be Test Case on Title VI Suits, 139 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-I (July
21, 1998); Cole & Moore, supra note 120, at 14A.
138. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 12.
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existence or nonexistence of alternatives. 139 The recipient should
have the primary burden -of production and proof to establish that a
less discriminatory alternative does not exist, but a complainant may
have a responsibility in some cases to present a less discriminatory
alternative that was not reasonably apparent to the recipient. 140
B.

Improving Tztle VI: Require Recipients to Identify Less
Discriminatory Alternatives, Implement Mitigation Measures,
and Provide for Public Participation, with the EPA to Provide
Technical Assistance

The EPA should implement four major changes to improve the
futerim Guidance. 141 First, the futerim Guidance should place the
burden on the recipient to demonstrate that there are no less
discriminatory alternatives that meet the applicant's reasonable
business needs. Second, the EPA should require the recipient to
establish that any mitigation measures will reduce any risks to
surrounding populations, including minority groups protected by
Title VI, to permissible levels and to examine whether such
mitigation measures could be used at less discriminatory alternatives
that meet the applicant's reasonable business needs. Third, the EPA
or recipient should provide technical assistance to Title VI
complainants, and should also provide technical assistance grants so
that complainants can hire their own technical experts. Finally,
recipients should adopt procedures to encourage early participation
by affected populations, especially minority groups, to avoid
controversies that lead to Title VI challenges.
1.

Proving That There Are No Less Discriminatory Alternatives

Title VI cases have inappropriately followed Title vn law in
placing the burdens of production and proof on plaintiffs to
demonstrate that a less discriminatory alternative exists. 142 fu Title
VI cases, if a defendant offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory
business or educational justification for its actions, most courts have
not required the defendant to consider alternative proposals with less
disparate impact. fustead, courts have placed the burden on the
plaintiff to demonstrate that a defendant failed to adopt an alternative
139. See generally id.; Gracer, supra note 117, at 10,375.
140. See infra Part Y.B.1.
141. See infra Part Y.C.
142. See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir.
1993); Colopy, supra note 19, at 161-62 & nn.l63-66; Hampton, supra note 60, at 553.
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practice with less discriminatory effect that would have met the
defendant's legitimate business objectives. 143 According to Title VI
case law, if a defendant does present evidence that it chose the least
discriminatory alternative, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant in fact did not do SO.I44 Title VI case law suggests that a
plaintiff must present a concrete alternative, rather than merely
speculate that such an alternative might exist. 145
Some commentators have argued that importing Title VII's
restrictive evidentiary standards into Title VI cases is unnecessary and
even contrary to the spirit of the latter statute because Title VII applies
to the private labor market, where there is a presumption of
employment at will. 146 Title VI pertains only to those parties who
voluntarily accept federal aid. 147 Furthennore, Title VII explicitly
acknowledges that defendants have affinnative defenses that may
justify disparate impacts and that employers do not have to hire either
women or minorities to precisely reflect their percentage of the
population.148
There is an even stronger argument that Title VII should not
serve as the evidentiary model for Title VI in addressing the question
of less discriminatory alternatives. Title VII cases have emphasized
that it is appropriate to place the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate
the existence of less discriminatory alternatives because placing an
affinnative burden on defendants to prove that there is no less
discriminatory alternative would interfere too much with private labor
markets. ''Because the courts are 'generally less competent than
employers to restructure business practice,' the courts should be
143. See generally Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407; NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc.,
657 F.2d 1322, 1336 (3d Cir. 1981); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1980);
Colopy, supra note 19, at 161-63 & n.163; Hampton, supra note 60, at 531,553; see also
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against I-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 128 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (questioning but not deciding the plaintiff's assertion that defendant had duty under
Title VI to discuss alternatives with less disparate impact).
144. See Wilmington Med. Ctr., 657 F.2d at 1336-37 (requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate that feasible, less discriminatory alternatives exist if defendant provides
reasonable justification for its actions, and suggesting that district court's "stringent standard"
of requiring defendant to produce evidence that it had chosen least discriminatory alternative
goes beyond Title VI's standard); Colopy, supra note 19, at 161-62 n.163.
145. See Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 128 (stating that plaintiff
must present concrete, reasonable alternative sites); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59,
§ 25D.04[3][g][iii], at 98-100 (arguing that environmental justice plaintiffs in Title VI actions
should be prepared to demonstrate availability of alternative sites); Fisher, supra note 13, at
326-28 (same); Hammer, supra note 26, at 708-09 (same).
146. See Watson, supra note 30, at 971-73.
147. See Fisher, supra note 13, at 320; Soon, supra note 77, at 1596 n.92; Watson,
supra note 30, at 971-73.
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2G) (1997).
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cautious in requiring that an employer adopt [alternative] practices
recommended by the plaintiff in such a context.,,149 However, as Title
VI recipients usually have greater expertise than complainants and
have voluntarily accepted federal assistance, it is appropriate to place
at least a limited burden on recipients to show no less discriminatory
alternatives exist without interfering with recipient's legitimate
policymaking discretion.
fustead of following Title VII and VI case law, the EPA should
place a limited burden of production and proof on the recipient
permitting agency, and indirectly on the permit applicant, to
demonstrate that there are no less discriminatory alternatives that meet
the applicant's reasonable business needs. ISO Furthermore, the futerim
Guidance's requirement that an alternative be "equally effective"
makes it too easy for a permitting agency and permittee to use minor
advantages to prefer their proposal to a reasonably effective
alternative. IS 1 Thus, the EPA should simply require that an alternative
is "comparably effective" or reasonably similar in meeting any
legitimate business needs of the permit applicant. On the other hand, it
is more difficult in the context of Title VI siting challenges to limit cost
or safety factors than it is in the case of Title VII claims alleging
intentional gender discrimination. Accordingly, the defendant should
be able to reject alternative sites that are significantly more expensive
or less safe than the proposed site.

a

The futerim Guidance Is Unclear

The Interim Guidance does not clearly specify whether the
complainant has the burden of proving that less discriminatory
alternatives exist or whether the recipient must show that such
alternatives do not exist. The futerim Guidance simply states that "a
justification offered will not be considered acceptable if it is shown
that a less discriminatory alternative exists."ls2
At least one commentator has suggested that the futerim
Guidance violates Title VI case law by improperly placing the burden
on the defendant recipient to demonstrate that no less discriminatory
149. Stutts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D. Ala 1994)
(quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989); Fumco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978»; Mahoney, supra note 56, at 488.
150. See generally Watson, supra note 30, at 977 (arguing that in Title VI cases
involving health care discrimination, "health care defendant[s] should bear the risk of nonpersuasion on both the important, legitimate business objective and the less discriminatory
alternatives''); Hampton, supra note 60, at 553.
151. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 12.
152. ld.
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alternative exists rather than to simply provide a legitimate business
justification for a decision. 153 In addition, while Title VI case law
requires a plaintiff to show that a less discriminatory alternative will
serve the defendant's legitimate business interests, the Interim
Guidance arguably does not require a complainant to establish that
such an alternative would reasonably meet the defendant's appropriate
needs. 154
On the other hand, the Interim Guidance states that an alternative
must be "equally effective" in relation to the proposed facility. 155 The
"equally effective" standard arguably places the burden of proof on the
complainant to demonstrate that any alternatives it proffers are equally
as good as the challenged proposal.
When it promulgates its final Title VI interim guidance, the EPA
should clearly specify the extent to which either the complainant or
recipient has the burden of production or proof as to whether a less
discriminatory alternative exists. Furthermore, EPA should not follow
Title VI and VII case law, which places the burdens of production and
proof on the plaintiff to establish that a less discriminatory alternative
exists and would reasonably meet the defendant's legitimate business
goals, and should instead place those burdens on the recipient.
b.

Defendant's Burden to Demonstrate No Less
Discriminatory Alternatives

The recipient permitting agency and, indirectly, the permit
applicant, should have a limited· burden of production and the
ultimate burden of proof to demonstrate that there are no less
discriminatory alternatives. The proposal goes beyond existing Title
VI case law, but the EPA has the authority under section 602 to
promulgate implementing regulations that go beyond section 601,
and has already done so by adopting a disparate impact standard
rather than requiring proof of discriminatory intent. 156 Recipient
agencies and permittees generally have greater resources and
expertise than complainants to investigate alternative sites. 157 In
addition, it is appropriate to place the burden of examining
153. See Gracer, supra note 117, at 10,375.
154. Seeid.
155. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
157. See generally NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1355 (3d
Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that defendant
health care organizations generally have more expertise than plaintiffs to formulate less
discriminatory alternatives regarding the location of health care facilities); Watson, supra
note 30, at 977 (same); Hampton, supra note 60, at 553 (same).
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alternatives on the recipient, because it has benefited from an EPA
grant that requires it not to engage in actions that cause disparate
impacts.158 Furthermore, the EPA's administrative process provides
few rights for complainants to participate in the investigation of a
complaint, but provides substantial appeal rights to recipients found
guilty of a violation. Therefore, it is reasonable to place the ultimate
burdens of production and proof in that process on the recipient, even
if it arguably would not be fair to do so in a lawsuit in which the
defendant does not enjoy such procedural protections.
fu many cases, the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),1S9 state mini-NEPAs, or substantive environmental statutes
require the agency to consider alternative sites or plans. 160 Building
upon this NEPA precedent, this Article proposes to interpret Title VI to
require the recipient to adopt the least discriminatory alternative that
reasonably serves the legitimate business needs of the recipient or
permit applicant. 161
Even though the recipient would have the burdens of production
and proof to demonstrate that no less discriminatory alternative than
the chosen site exists, the EPA should try to limit the cost of those
burdens as much as possible without harming the legitimate concerns
of the complainant. Conducting such investigations of alternative sites
is less burdensome than it might seem at first because recipient
agencies and permit applicants are often required by the recipient's
permitting and siting rules to compile a list of several potential sites
and to rank them before making a final selection. 162 While plaintiffs
could use the recipient's list to point out alternatives, the recipient and
permit applicant are likely to understand better the strengths and
IS8. See Watson, supra note 30, at 977 (arguing that burden of proof should be on
recipient because it has accepted federal grant money).
IS9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1997).
160. See § 4332(2)(C)(iii); 40 C.F.R. § IS02.14 (1997); 33 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1998);
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and
"Justice",47 AM. U. L. REv. 221, 293 n.3S8 (1997) (listing thirteen states and Puerto Rico
as having state statutes or regulations based on NEPA that require agency to consider
alternatives).
161. See 40 C.F.R. § IS0S.2 (1997) (requiring that fmal ROD (record of decision)
discuss why proposal was selected in preference to alternatives); Kaswan, supra note 160, at
294; Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPAs in the Quest/or Environmental Justice, 30 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 56S, 577 (1997) (determining that NEPA requires identification of alternatives,
but does not require agency to select least environmentally damaging alternative); see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.04(6) (West 1997) (requiring state to adopt feasible and prudent
alternative that is less environmentally destructive).
162. See Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 34S-S1 (discussing various
state siting processes); Colopy, supra note 19, at 163 n.l69 (determining that some
defendants in siting cases have chosen from a list of potential sites).
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weaknesses of potential sites because they have compiled the list;
therefore, the burden should be on the recipient to explain whether
other sites on the list would have less discriminatory impact and to
what extent other sites could meet the applicant's legitimate business
needs. Accordingly, recipients should have the burden of production
and proofto consider alternative sites.
While the burden of production and proof should be on recipient
agencies to examine alternative sites, the EPA could place reasonable
limits on the range of alternative sites that a recipient must consider.
In Title VI cases involving the siting of public facilities, courts have
been reluctant to consider alternatives that require substantial
modification of the defendant's goals because of the risk that the
judiciary would exceed its constitutional role by inappropriately
substituting its policy choices in place of those of elected and
appointed officials. 163 The EPA is not bound by the same Article ill
limitations as courts in enforcing Title VI, but the broad criticism of
the Interim Guidance by state and local officials across the nation
suggests that the EPA must be cautious about interfering too much
with the policy choices of state or local recipient agencies, or face
strong criticism that its policies are hampering economic
development. l64
As a practical political matter, the EPA's Title VI policy probably
should follow case law in limiting the range of alternatives that a
recipient must consider. For example, a recipient would not have to
consider alternatives that would involve a significant change in the
permit applicant's legitimate business goals. On the other hand, as
will be explained below, the appropriate question should be whether an
alternative is "comparably effective" rather than whether it is "equally
effective.,,165 A recipient should not use minor differences to reject a
less discriminatory alternative that can meet its legitimate business
needs.
In addition, a recipient should not have to disprove every possible
alternative, but only reasonably apparent alternatives. 166 Such a
163. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612,619 (2d Cir. 1980) (warning, in Title VI case,
that court should require plaintiffs to focus on comparable alternatives and not consider
alternatives based on significantly different policy choices because of danger court would
substitute its policy judgments for elected and appointed officials); Been, Equity Issues, supra
note 59, § 25D.04[3)[g)[iii), at 99-100.
164. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
165. See infra.
166. See generally Watson, supra note 30, at 977 (arguing that in Title VI cases
involving health care discrimination, health care defendants should have a duty to examine
reasonable alternatives, but not to "disprove every conceivable alternative").
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limitation is consistent with Title VII's requirement that a defendant
may be held liable only if it refuses to implement a less discriminatory
alternative. 167 A recipient should not be held in violation of Title VI if
it did not know or should have known about the existence of a less
discriminatory alternative.
In NEPA cases, if a complainant simply submits a long "laundry
lisf' of conceivable alternatives, a court may apply a "rule of reason"
and refuse to require an agency to conduct an expensive or intensive
investigation of every possible alternative. 168 Applying such a "rule of
reason," the Supreme Court, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., concluded that even
though agencies have a duty under NEPA to examine alternatives,
agencies are not required to examine every alternative raised; they
may require an intervenor to show why an alternative merits further
study.169 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission had not required the
complainants even to establish a prima facie case that an alternative
was effective, but merely asked the complainant to make a sufficient
showing that energy conservation and other suggested alternatives
were worth further study and examinationYo A majority of NEPA
cases place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to demonstrate that an
agency's Environmental Impact Statement (ElS) is inadequate,111 and

167. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text
168. See Vennont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 552-53 (1978) (concluding that, where complainant submitted
long list of altematives, including "energy conservation," agency did not have obligation to
investigate every single altemative raised, but only to explore relatively apparent altematives
or alternatives that complainant had explained in sufficient detail); Fayetteville Area
Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, 515 F.2d 1021, 1027 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying "rule of
reason" standard to limit agency's consideration of altematives in preparing Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS»; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,
836-38 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that agency's discussion of altematives in an EIS was
govemed by rule of reason); Council on Environmental Quality, Forty Most Asked Questions
Conceming CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, Question 16,46 Fed.
Reg. 18,026, 18,037 (1981) (stating that if "a very large number of altematives" are
potentially available, agency may limit consideration to a ''reasonable number" as long as
agency evaluates an adequate range of altematives); DANIEL R. MANoELKER, NEPA LAW
AND LmGATION § 9.05[2], [3] (1992 & Supp. 1998) (discussing Morton and Vermont
Yankee); id. § 10.09[4] n.36 (listing cases applying "rule of reason").
169. 435 U.S. at 552-54 (stating that petitioner has duty under NEPA and basic
principles of administrative law to raise issues before agency rather than engage in trial by
ambush and that agency only has duty to explore relatively apparent altematives).
170. See id.; MANoELKER, supra note 168, § 9.05[3] (discussing Vermont Yankee).
171. See MANoELKER, supra note 168, § 4.09[8] n.l43 (listing cases).
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some courts have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that their proposed
alternatives are reasonable and feasible. 172
Arguably, cases such as Vermont Yankee place too heavy a
burden on environmental groups to introduce evidence that challenges
an agency's findings or methodology.
Environmental groups'
resources to investigate alternatives are usually far more limited then
those of agencies. The proposal173 to provide technical assistance
grants to such groups would at best prov.ide only very limited
resources for them to examine alternatives. On the other hand,
complainants should not simply submit a long list of alternatives to an
agency and then refuse to participate in the internal hearing process, as
did the petitioners in Vermont Yankee. 174
Because recipient state or local permitting agencies generally
possess greater resources and expertise than complainants, the EPA
should not place the burden of proof on complainants to demonstrate
that a proposed alternative is equally or even comparably effective to
the proposal. However, the EPA may require that a complainant
demonstrate that during the public comment period of the permitting
process it presented a proposed less discriminatory alternative that the
recipient unreasonably failed to investigate further or that the recipient
failed to adequately consider reasonably apparent alternative sites.
Once a complainant has sufficiently identified a less discriminatory
,alternative and provided a plausible suggestion for why it might be
reasonably effective, then the burden of production and proof would
shift back to the recipient to explain why that alternative is less
acceptable than the proposed facility. The ultimate burden of
production and proof should be on the recipient, because it usually has
greater expertise than most complainants, and because it has benefited
from a federal grant. 175 Nevertheless, a complainant should, to the
extent possible, raise specific alternatives so that a recipient can
efficiently respond to those charges without engaging ill an
unnecessarily expensive and open ended investigation.
c.

''Equally Effective" Alternatives

Title vn cases have generally adopted Wards Cove's standard
that plaintiffs must prove that an alternative would be equally
172. See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against I-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110,
128 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (quoting Citizens Committee Against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis,
542 F. Supp. 496, 522 (S.D. Ohio 1982)); Colopy, supra note 19, at 163 n.l69.
173. See infra Part V.B.3.
174. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 552-53.
175. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 73 Tul. L. Rev. 822 1998-1999

1999]

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND TITLE VI

823

effective, would have less disproportionate effect, and would not cost
significantly more. 176 At least one recent Title VII case has required
the plaintiff to show that a less discriminatory alternative is
"comparably effective."177 Title VI case law is even less clear about
whether a plaintiff must prove that a less discriminatory alternative is
"equally effective,,178 or only ''that there exists a comparably
effective alternative practice which would result in less
disproportionality."179
The EPA has adopted the "equally effective" standard in its
Interim Guidance, but does not explain when an alternative should be
considered "equally effective.,,18o The "equally effective" standard
makes it too easy for defendants to use minor differences to reject
reasonably good sites. Instead, the EPA should require a recipient to
adopt a less discriminatory alternative that is "comparably
effective.,,181 The EPA should not allow defendants to impose criteria
that artificially exclude reasonably effective alternative sites in areas
with lower minority populations. In particular, the EPA should require
a recipient to implement a less discriminatory alternative unless the
recipient can demonstrate that it is significantly more expensive, less
efficient, or less safe than a more discriminatory challenged proposal.
d.

Cost as a Factor

A difficult issue concerns the extent to which a recipient agency
may use cost as a justification to exclude less discriminatory
alternatives on the grounds that the proposed site is less expensive
than any alternative site. Following Wards Cove, Title VII cases
generally require plaintiffs to demonstrate that an alternative is
"equally effective" by showing that a less discriminatory alternative

176. See York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948, 955 (10th Cir. 1996); MacPherson v. University
of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 771 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989)); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 486-89.
177. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1121 (11th Cir. 1993).
178. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1417 (11th Cir. 1985).
179. Elston v. Talladega County Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1993).
180. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 12.
181. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 (stating that alternative must be "comparably
effective''); Coalition of Concerned Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 128 (stating that plaintiff must
present concrete alternative sites); see also Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59,
§ 25D.04[3][g][iii], at 98-100 (arguing that environmental justice plaintiff in Title VI action
should be prepared to demonstrate availability of alternative sites); Fisher, supra note 13, at
321 (same); Hammer, supra note 26, at 708-09 (same).
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would not cost significantly more than the challenged policy.182
Similarly, in Title VI cases challenging allegedly discriminatory
hospital closings or relocations, courts have allowed defendants to
demonstrate that their proposals would save more money than less
discriminatory alternatives. 183
If a low-income minority group lives in an area with significantly
lower land prices, a recipient may argue that such lower land prices are
a substantial business reason for selecting a site and, accordingly, that
any disparate impacts on minority groups are justified. 184 Because
minority groups, on average, have lower incomes than whites and, as a
result, often live in areas with lower land prices, allowing recipients
and developers to use lower costs as a justification may place many
minorities at risk. 185
Some commentators have argued that only extraordinary costs
that would put an employer out of business should be a defense in
Title VII employment cases; society should require employers to bear
the costs associated with achieving racial or gender equality unless
these costs are so great that a business could not operate if it, for
instance, hires female workers. 186 In Title VII cases alleging disparate
treatment or intentional discrimination, the Supreme Court has
generally rejected the defense of increased cost when raised as a bona
fide occupational qualification for not hiring women or charging them
larger pension contributions, unless such costs would be so great that
182. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (stating that
"[fJactors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are
relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice
in serving the employer's legitimate business goals'') (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion)); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 727, 740 (S.D. Fla 1997) (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661); Rudder v. District of
Columbia, 890 F. Supp. 23, 46 (D.D.C. 1995) (same), aff'd, 99 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Stutts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (N.D. Ala 1994) (same); Mahoney,
supra note 56, at 488-89 & n.305 (citing and quoting cases).
183. See NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316, 339-40, 342
(D. Del. 1980) (finding that cost justified hospital relocation in Title VI case), aff'd, 657 F.2d
1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); Bryan v. Koch, 492 F. Supp. 212, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(same), aff'd, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59,
§ 25D.04[3][g][ii][A], at 92-94 (citing cases); Watson, supra note 30, at 966-69; see also
Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 905 (B.D. Mo. 1979) (denying preliminary injunction
against closing and consolidation of hospital services based on cost savings of$7 million per
year in Title VI case), aff'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980).
184. See Centner et al., supra note 67, at 140.
185. See generally Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 12, at 1392-97 (suggesting
that environmental disparities are often largely the result of income rather than primarily
caused by race).
186., See Grover, supra note 69, at 398 n.40; Note, Less Discriminatory Alternatives,
supra note 100, at 1629-31.
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an industry could not bear them. 187 On the other hand, in Title VII
cases not involving intentional sex discrimination, courts generally
allow significant cost differences to serve as a justification for
discriminatory practices. 188
While prohibiting defendants from raising costs as a defense
unless those costs are of extraordinary magnitude would provide
greater protection to minorities by forcing recipients to use more
expensive alternative sites, such a policy might discourage any
economic development in minority areas, including redevelopment of
brownfields. Instead of prohibiting cost defenses, the EPA should
simply place the burden on the recipient rather than the complainant to
demonstrate that any alternative site would be significantly more
expensive and that the added cost would make it substantially more
difficult to achieve the permit applicant's legitimate business goals.
It would be more difficult to disallow totally cost as a justification
in Title VI siting cases than Title VII employment discrimination
actions. Courts can require all employers in an industry to bear, for
instance, the costs of sex equality.189 Such cost equalization is more
difficult in the context of environmental siting because it is impractical
to close existing facilities that have already benefited from lower land
costs. Furthermore, because land prices vary significantly from
location to location, it is difficult to say when discrimination may have
influenced the value of land or the number of minorities in an area. A
blanket rule that developers cannot locate where land is cheap if there
are significant numbers of minorities in an area would discourage
economic development or redevelopment in minority areas. Many
mayors have criticized the Interim Guidance because it might
discourage development of brownfields, and they would certainty
oppose an explicit policy against development in low-cost minority
areas. 190
187. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-211
(1991) (rejecting increased cost and reproductive safety as justifications for not hiring
women); City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 & n.32
(1978) (holding under Title VII that increased cost of providing pensions to women does not
justify sex discrimination); Note, Less Discriminatory AlternatiVes, supra note 100, at 162831.
188. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text
189. See Note, Less Discriminatory Alternatives, supra note 100, at 1633-34
("Provided that courts impose restructuring on all employers equally, no disadvantage will
attach to any individual business."). However, it may be more difficult for industries
involved in intemational competition to pass on costs, but Congress has rejected that
argument by extending employment discrimination law extraterritorially. See id. at 1634;
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109,42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
190. See Conference ofMayors, supra note 118, at 469.
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Even if it is not possible to prohibit totally the consideration of
cost as a justification for selecting a site in a heavily minority area, an
improved interim guidance on Title VI could require the pennitting
agency and pennittee to demonstrate that the selected site is
significantly less expensive than any less discriminatory alternative. 191
Some Title VII cases have suggested £lat Wards Cove's "equally
effective" standard means that a plaintiff must show that an alternative
is not significantly more expensive, not that the costs must be exactly
the same. 192 If costs are roughly the same, the EPA should not allow
recipients to use insignificant cost differences as a pretext to justify the
selection of a site for unspoken discriminatory reasons, including that
the minority community may have less political clout to block a
proposal than a nonminority community. However, if there are some
cost differences between a minority site and a less discriminatory
alternative, it may be difficult to challenge a pennittee's assertion that
such a difference would affect its ability to compete even if that claim
is a pretext for hidden discriminatory motives. Still, placing the
burden on the permitting agency and pennittee to show that the
selected site is significantly less expensive than any less discriminatory
alternative should discourage blatantly discriminatory efforts to pick
minority communities because they are politically weaker than
comparable alternative areas.
e.

Safety as a Justification

In Title VII cases, the Supreme Court has usually allowed safety
or efficiency considerations to serve as legitimate business
justifications for discriminatory practices,193 but has rejected the
defense of reproductive safety when raised as a bona fide
occupational qualification for not hiring women. 194 Courts in Title
VI cases involving hospital consolidations or relocations have
allowed defendants to justify moves to areas with lower minority
populations because the defendant's previously fragmented facilities
contributed to serious problems in the quality of care, and

191. See Watson, supra note 30, at 977 (arguing that "[aJ more costly less
discriminatory alternative is acceptable as long as the cost differential is not too substantial").
192. See Nash v. Consolidated City of Jacksonville, 895 F. Supp. 1536, 1553 (M.D.
Fla 1995) (ruling that the plaintiff failed to present alternatives that did not involve "greatly
increased costs"); Mahoney, supra note 56, at 488-89 & n.305 (citing and quoting cases); see
also Allen v. District of Columbia, 812 F. Supp. 1239, 1245 (D.D.C. 1993) (stating that less
discriminatory alternative must be "both possible and practical").
193. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text
194. See supra notes 103 and accompanying text.
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consolidation or relocation would significantly improve care. 195
Similarly, Title VI defendants in environmental siting cases are likely
to argue that safety, geology, or transportation convenience justify the
selection of a site in a minority area. 196
The EPA should place the burden on the recipient to show that
less discriminatory sites would be significantly less safe or efficient
than the challenged proposal. While it is more difficult to reject safety
as a justification in Title VI siting cases than in Title VII employment
discrimination actions, the EPA should ensure that comparable less
discriminatory sites do not exist that would provide similar
advantages. Women who are capable of bearing children should have
the option of working in industries where there are unavoidable
reproductive risks, even if the employer reasonably fears increased
medical costs or liability risks. The Supreme Court has recognized
reproductive choice as an important value, and excluding women from
suchjobs would significantly hinder their employment opportunities in
violation of Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. 197

195. See NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316, 341-42 (D.
Del. 1980) (finding, in Title VI case, that quality and efficiency of consolidation justified
hospital relocation and consolidation where hospital could show the change was "essential"
to maintain high quality care and to avoid losing accreditation because previously fragmented
facilities contributed to serious problems in the quality of care), aff'd, 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir.
1981) (en banc); United States v. Bexar County, 484 F. Supp. 855, 859 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
(stating that transportation problems caused by relocation would be outweighed by quality
concerns); Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896, 904-905 (B.D. Mo. 1979) (finding that
efficiency, including occupancy rates, and quality concerns, such as number of life support
units and medical school access, justified relocation), aff'd, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1980);
Been, Equity Issues, supra note 59, § 25D.04[3][g][ii][A], at 92-94 (citing cases); Watson,
supra note 30, at 966-69; Hampton, supra note 60, at 536-42.
196. See, e.g., Joan Z. Bernstein, The Siting of Commercial Waste Facilities: An
Evolution ofCommunity Land Use DecisiOns, 1 KAN. IL. & PUB. POL'y 83, 84 (1991) ("The
waste industry's criteria for identifying attractive sites has evolved over the last several
decades, from considerations that were primarily financial to considerations that reflect the
priority of protecting human health and the environment''); Charles J. McDermott,
Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.I 689, 697 (1994)
(arguing that WMX's Emelle landfill in predominantly African-American Sumter County,
Alabama was chosen because of good transportation, its aridity, sparse population, and "most
importantly, [because it] was located atop the 'Selma chalk formation",); Jane Seigler,
Environmental Justice: An Industry Perspective, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 59
(1993-94) (same). But see Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Questfor Environmental
Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 729 (1993) [hereinafter Foster, Race(ial) Matters] (criticizing
use of race-neutral grounds by private industry and suggesting they may be cover for racism);
Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 398-424 (arguing that current siting schemes
may under protect the most vulnerable populations living near a proposed facility).
197. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-207
(1991) (rejecting reproductive safety as justification for not hiring women).
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On the other hand, if a developer legitimately demonstrates that a
minority site is safer than any less discriminatory alternative because,
for example, there are unique geological fonnations in the minority
area that inhibit spills from reaching underground aquifers, then such a
justification should be allowed. 198 There is no reason to believe that
minority areas are disproportionately safer than majority areas.
Indeed, to the extent that discriminatory siting has occurred in the past
in areas such as Louisiana's "cancer alley,,,199 a policy focusing on
safety should benefit minority groups more than hurt them.
Nevertheless, the pennitting agency and pennittee should bear the
burden of establishing that safety concerns are not a pretext to justify
the selection of a site for unspoken discriminatory reasons.
2.

Requiring Legitimate Mitigation Measures

The Congressional Black Caucus and environmental justice
advocates have argued that the Interim Guidance is inconsistent with
Title VI case law because it allows mitigation measures to be used to
justify a project that would otherwise pose unacceptable risks to
groups protected under the statute?OO While their fear that mitigation
measures will be used to legitimate otherwise unacceptable projects
raises genuine concerns, a total prohibition on considering mitigation
measures is probably unrealistic. Instead, the pennitting agency and
pennittee should bear the burden of establishing that any mitigation
measures used to reduce disparate impacts to an acceptable level will
in fact work, and will reduce any risks to surrounding populations,
including minority groups protected by Title VI, to pennissible
levels. Moreover, the pennitting agency and pennittee should have
the burden of examining whether such mitigation measures could be

198. See Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 398-99 (discussing industry's
argument that Emelle Landfill was located in heavily minority Sumter County, Alabama, not
because of race, but because Selma chalk formation provides 700-foot barrier from the
nearest aquifer); McDermott, supra note 196, at 697 (same). But see Foster, Race(ial)
Matters, supra note 196, at 729 (suggesting that private industry's use of race-neutral grounds
may be cover for racism).
199. The term "cancer alley" refers to the approximately 85-mile corridor from Baton
Rouge to New Orleans, Louisiana, which contains numerous petrochemical facilities and a
large minority population. See Saleem, supra note 25, at 230 n.80 (discussing high level of
pollution and substantial minority population in St James Parish, Louisiana). But see
CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 75-76 (1998)
(observing that there are high levels of pollution and substantial minority populations in the
so-called "cancer alley" area, but arguing that a recent study did not fmd elevated cancer rates
in that area).
200. See Baggetta, supra note 137, at A-I.
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used in conjunction with less discriminatory alternatives that meet
the applicant's reasonable business needs.
It could be argued that, if a project would pose unacceptable risks
to any population group, including minority and ethnic groups
protected by Title VI, mitigation measures should not be used to
justify such a project, because there are usually no guarantees that such
mitigation will work. On the other hand, if there are effective
mitigation measures available, such as the placement of a buffer zone
around a polluting facility to keep any harmful effects from
surrounding population201 or the provision of enhanced fire fighting
equipment to address any increased risk of fires,2°2 then it is
unreasonable to simply ignore actions that reduce risks.
In other areas of environmental law, it is common to consider
mitigative procedures. The NEPA requires federal agencies, state or
local governments that receive substantial federal financial assistance
for a project, or certain federal permit applicants to prepare an EIS for
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment,,,203 or to issue a finding of no significant impact
(FONSI)?04 NEPA does not require that agencies or private applicants
actually implement mitigation measures, but the lead agency must
discuss how such measures could minimize any environmental
impacts.205

201. See Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risk
Index Taxes, 53 OInO ST. LJ. 761, 776-78 (1992).
202. Bradford C. Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up
Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Met/iation Slay the Monster?, 19

B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 272-74,276 (l991-92).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1997). To detennine whether a proposed action is a
"major Federal actionO significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"
requiring an EIS, agencies draft an Environmental Assessment (EA) that examines the need
for the project, considers alternatives to the proposal, discusses the impacts of the proposal
and any alternatives, and may discuss mitigation measures. See Valerie M. Fogleman,
Environmental Impact Statements, in 1 ENvIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND
FEDERAL LAW § 1.07 (Michael Gerrard ed. 1997); Johnson, supra note 161, at 570. If a
permit application by a private party requires an EIS, the permitting agency must draft the
EIS, but may collaborate with the applicant. See Fogleman, supra, § 1.09[2][c], at 60. A
state agency, however, may draft an EIS when the proposed action is federally funded. See
id.
204. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1997); MANDELKER, supra note 168, § 8.08[2], [3]
(discussing cases upholding or rejecting a finding of no significant impact).
205. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (l997); see also Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352-53 (l989); MANDELKER, supra note 168, § 8.08[10] n.76. A few
states require agencies to implement feasible mitigation measures or alternatives. See CAL.
PUB. REs. CODE § 21002.1(b) (Deering 1996) (requiring state agencies to mitigate or avoid
significant environmental impacts if "feasible''); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D.04(6) (West
1997) (requiring state to adopt feasible and prudent alternative that is less environmentally
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Courts have held and the White House Council on
Environmental Quality has suggested that agencies, sometimes
working in collaboration with private applicants, may avoid preparing
an EIS by mitigating the impacts of their projects in the planning
stages and then preparing a mitigated FONSI that relies on the
mitigation measures to bring any adverse effects from the project
below the level of "significance" triggering an EIS.206 Also, in an
attempt to achieve a national goal of "no net loss" of wetlands, the
Army Corps of Engineers frequently requires mitigation measures as a
condition for obtaining a wetlands permit.207
While some environmentalists, as a matter of principle, would
not allow mitigation measures to justify an otherwise unacceptable
project, it does not make sense to ignore the fact that effective
mitigation measures can reduce or eliminate a project's impacts.
Environmentalists' have, however, raised two important questions
about when it'is appropriate to use mitigation measures to justify a
project. First, mitigation measures should be enforceable, rather than
mere promises made to be broken. There has been some question
about whether and to what extent courts will enforce mitigation
promises, by either government or private project sponsors, that are
used to justify a mitigated FONSI, especially once the sponsor
completes the project?°8 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has held that mitigation promises by third parties not
responsible for an environmental assessment "must be more than mere

destructive); N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) (McKinney 1997) (requiring
mitigation to maximum extent practicable); Johnson, supra note 161, at 597-99.
206. See Preserve Endangered Areas of Cobb's Histol)', Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 87 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 1996); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14
F.3d 1324, 1327-29 (9th Cir. 1992); Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak
Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 681-83 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Council on Environmental
Quality, supra note 168, at Question 39, 18,037; MANDELKER, supra note 168, § 8.08[10];
Fogleman, supra note 203, § 1.07[3]; Albert I. Herson, Project Mitigation Revisited: Most
Courts Approve Findings ofNo Significant Impact Justified by Mitigation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q.
51,69 (1986); Johnson, supra note 161, at 576; Thomas O. McGarity, Judicial Enforcement
ofNEPA-Inspired Promises, 20 ENvrL. L. 569, 577-91 (1990).
207. See 40 C.F.R § 230.IO(d) (1997) (requiring compensatol)' mitigation in
appropriate circumstances); 33 C.F.R § 320.4(r) (1998); Memorandum of Agreement
Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Army Concerning
the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55
Fed. Reg. 9,211 (1990) [hereinafter Mitigation MOA]; see also Friends of the Earth v. Hintz,
800 F.2d 822, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding mitigation through off-site purchase of
wetlands); MANDELKER, supra note 168, § 8.08[10]; Marc R Bulson, Off-Site Mitigation and
the EIS Threshold: NEPA's Faulty Framework, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 101,
105-07 (1992).
208. See McGarity, supra note 206, at 580.
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vague statements of good intentions.,,209 On the other hand, once a
project is largely or wholly completed, a court may be reluctant to
issue an injunction to prevent operation of a project unless the sponsor
has "hlatant[ly]" intended to violate NEPA and there is irreparable
harm to the public interest that outweighs the benefits of the project.2IO
Second, one must consider the issue of how closely related to a
project mitigation measures must be to be acceptable. For example,
the Army Corps of Engineers prefers on-site or in-kind wetlands
mitigation, but allows the use of off-site mitigation, including cash
payments to large wetlands ''banks''?l1 Environmentalists frequently
argue that only mitigation measures directly related to a project should
count because there is often a danger that off-site mitigation measures
will not adequately compensate for a project's impacts.212 Most courts,
however, have allowed agencies to use off-site mitigation measures to
compensate for a project's impacts.213 The EPA has increasingly
encouraged defendants owing civil penalties to consider supplemental
environmental projects (SEPs) in lieu of paying monetary penalties to
the United States Treasury.214 Moreover, penalties in citizen suits have
often included such projects.215
209. Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1982).
210. See Richland Park Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Pierce, 671 F.2d 935, 942 (5th Cir.
1982) (holding that the plaintiffs' NEPA claims were moot even though the agency failed to
prepare special "environmental clearance" required by the agency's own regulations because
NEPA is forward-looking statute that does not apply when project is completed unless
agency has committed a ''blatant'' NEPA violation and caused irreparable harm to public
interest); McGarity, supra note 206, at 580-83.
211. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.1O(d) (1997) (requiring compensatory mitigation in
appropriate circumstances); President Clinton, Protecting America's Wetlands: A Fair,
Flexible and Effective Approach, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,718-722 (1994) (referring to U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers guidance letter implementing President's policy initiative that includes
wetlands banking); Mitigation MOA, supra note 207, at 9,212; Michael G. Le Desma, Note,
A Sound ofThunder: Problems and Prospects in Wetland Mitigation Banking, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 497, 499-500 (1994); Jonathan Silverstein, Comment, Taking Wetlands to the
Bank: The Role of Wetland Mitigation Banking in a Comprehensive Approach to Wetlands
Protection, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 129, 132-34 (1994).
212. See Preservation Coalition, 667 F.2d at 860, (holding that mitigation measures

must be related to the project at issue and that general air pollution control requirements for
automobiles did not count as mitigation for increased automobile traffic resulting from
downtown center redevelopment project). See generally Bulson, supra note 207 (arguing
that courts should apply a more stringent standard of review under NEPA when a agency uses
off-site mitigation to justify a project).
213. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1989)
(observing that EIS discussed several off-site mitigation options); Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 366-67 (1989) (noting that EIS mitigated fish loss from
dam through off-site hatchery); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837-38 (9th Cir.
1986) (upholding mitigation through off-site purchase of wetlands).
214. See EPA, EPA Final Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed.
Reg. 24,796 (1998); Christopher D. Carey, Negotiating Environmental Penalties: Guidance
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The Interim Guidance states that, if it is impracticable for a
pennittee to mitigate sufficiently the public health or environmental
impacts of a proposal, the EPA will consider the benefits of
"supplemental mitigation projects" (SMPs), along with project related
mitigation efforts, in detennining whether the recipient and pennittee
have adequately addressed the disparate impacts of a project and
sufficiently compensated the affected community?16 The Interim
Guidance suggests that SMPs are attractive because they can address
"concerns associated with the pennitting of the facility raised by the
complainant that cannot otherwise be redressed under Title VI (i.e.,
because they are outside those considerations ordinarily entertained by
the pennitting authority).,,217 For instance, a developer that cannot
sufficiently reduce air pollution impacts from a project might
undertake a beneficial wetlands project.
On the other hand,
environmentalists are justifiably concerned that an unrelated
supplemental mitigation project may not address the harms flowing
from the project. If a supplemental project enhances biodiversity, but
does nothing to reduce unacceptable human health effects from a
project, then such mitigation should not count. While the guidelines
should not prohibit all types of supplemental or off-site mitigation, the
EPA should amend its supplemental mitigation proposal to require that
any mitigation address similar health or environmental risks as those
caused by the project. If toxic air pollution from a project increases
the risk of, for instance, colon cancer, an appropriate supplemental
project might reduce toxic water pollution that causes the same
disease. In light of society's limited knowledge about causes and
comparative risk of different diseases, the EPA should not allow a
project to justify an unacceptable cancer risk, such as a one in one
thousand increased risk of cancer, with a supplemental mitigation
project that may reduce the incidence of an unrelated harm, such as
neurological disease caused by lead poisoning. Furthermore, the EPA
should be cautious about allowing pollution reductions in one

on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects, 44 A.F. L. Rev. 1 (1998); Leslie J.
Kaschak, Note, Supplemental Environmental Projects: Evolution ofa Policy, 2 ENVTL. LAW.
465 (1996).
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1997) (specifically authorizing supplemental
environmental projects of up to $100,000 under Clean Air Act); Quan B. Nghiern, Comment,
Using Equitable Discretion to Impose Supplemental Environmental Projects Under the Clean
Water Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 561, 562 n.6 (1997) Oisting several decisions
approving supplemental environmental project under the Clean Water Act).
216. See EPA, INTERlM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 11-12.
217. Id. at 12.
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medium, such as water, substitute for increased pollution in another
medium, such as the air.2!8
At the very least, pennit applicants and pennitting agencies
should have the burden of demonstrating that any proffered mitigation
measures will actually work and will reduce any health or
environmental impacts of a proposal to acceptable levels. Industry and
state or local pennitting agencies would probably agree that proposed
mitigation techniques ought to be made in good faith; it is difficult to
argue that project sponsors and pennitting agencies should use
mitigation measures to justify a project if they have no real intention to
carry out such protective techniques. Industry and state or local
pennitting agencies probably would oppose imposing sanctions if
good faith mitigation proposals do not work as well in practice as
predicted at the time of a pennit application.
If it is impracticable to carry out proposed mitigation measures
that were used to justify a project, the EPA ought to ensure that a
pennittee and the pennitting agency take alternative steps that provide
substantially equivalent protection, or that the pennitting agency shut
down a project if it poses unacceptable risks. The more difficult
question is what to do when the mitigation measures are less effective
than predicted, but the facility is marginally safe.
The Interim Guidance requires that the recipient determine
whether mitigation measures can serve as "less discriminatory
alternatives.,,219 The Interim Guidance does not explain, however,
whether this requirement applies only to the proposed site, or also to
potential alternative sites. The EPA should explicitly require recipients
to examine whether such mitigation measures could also be used at
less discriminatory alternative sites that meet the applicant's
reasonable business needs. If a proposed site that would otherwise
pose unacceptable risks can be made safe through the use of mitigation
measures, it is not unreasonable to ask whether those techniques might
make a less discriminatory alternative site that meets the applicant's
reasonable business needs acceptable as well. As a practical matter,
the cost of evaluating the impact of mitigation measures might justify
218. See generally Hornstein, supra note 68, at 584-616 (arguing that comparative risk
analysis has many limitations); Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 394-97 (same);
Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency sProject XL and Other Regulatory
Refonn Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 EcoLOGY L.Q. 1, 70-73
(1998) [hereinafter Mank, Project XL] (criticizing proposals for cross-media trading and
emphasizing society's limited scientific knowledge about comparative harm of different
diseases); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey
from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 103, 189-90 (1998) (same).
219. See EPA, lNrERlM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 12.
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focusing on a relatively small number of potentially less
discriminatory alternative sites. If mitigation strategies can be used to
justifY siting a facility in a minority area, presumably the same
techniques might make a majority area suitable for the facility.
3.

Technical Assistance Grants

Furthermore, for environmental permitting decisions to have
legitimacy in a democratic society, it is important that a permitting
agency provide significant opportunities for public participation,
rather than make decisions by administrative fiat. 220 If an agency
simply provides opportunities for public comment, however, it may
not reach disadvantaged groupS.221 Accordingly, the EPA should take
affirmative steps to ensure broad participation by minority and lowincome populations by providing technical assistance to Title VI
complainants and should also provide technical assistance grants so
that complainants can hire their own technical experts or require
recipients to provide them. Under its section 602 regulations, the
EPA cannot award damages to complainants222 or provide attorneys
fees.223
Accordingly, there is no incentive for profit-motivated
experts or attorneys to provide technical assistance. In other areas of
environmental law, the EPA has provided technical assistance grants
to environmental organizations; although these grants are often too
small and the application process is so cumbersome for the average
community organization that they need to hire experts to apply for a
grant to hire such experts!224
220. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical
Review, 14 CoLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 501, 523-30 (1989); Sheila Foster, Justicefrom the Ground
Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the
Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REv. 775, 831-32 (1998) [hereinafter Foster,
Justice from the Ground Up]; Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 370; Douglas R
Williams, Environmental Law and Democratic Legitimacy, 4 DUKE ENvrL. L. & POL'y F. 1,

19-31 (1994).
221. See Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup:
Expanding Public Participation in the Federal Supeifund Program, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
671, 675-77 (1994); Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 369.
222. See 40 C.F.R § 7.130(a) (1997); Hammer, supra note 26, at 711.
223. See North Carolina Dep't ofTransp. v. Crest St. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 12-16

(1986) (stating that agencies cannot award attorneys fees to complainants even if an agency
finds a violation, but successful plaintiffs who file a private lawsuit under Title VI may
recover attorneys fees).
224. See Ferris, supra note 221, at 679-80; Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 7879. See generally EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASfE AND EMERGENCY REsPONSE, SUPERFUND
TEcHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANT HANDBOOK: APPLYING FOR YOUR GRANT (1993) (EPA 540K-93-003) [hereinafter EPA, APPLYING FOR YOUR GRANT]; EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE
AND EMERGENCY REsPONSE, SUPERFUND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANT HANDBOOK: THE
APPLICATION FORMS WITH mSTRuCI10Ns (1993) (EPA 540-K-93-004).
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The EPA already provides grants to state, tribal, and local
governments to help them comply with Title VI and to achieve
environmental justice goals. In fiscal year 1998, the Office of
Environmental Justice expected to award $500,000 under the State and
Tribal Environmental Justice Grants Program, with a maximum of
$100,000 per grant.225 In addition, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of
Environmental Justice expected to award $3.5 million to local
governments to establish pilot programs for its enhanced
Environmental Monitoring for Public Access and Cornmunity
Tracking (EMPACT) Grants Program that will likely include programs
enhancing the ability of the public to identify pollution that has a
disparate impact on minorities?26
Section 117(e) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) ''provides for technical
assistance grants of up to $50,000 for any group or individual affected
by a release or threatened release at any abandoned hazardous waste
facility that is listed on the National Priorities List under the National
Contingency Plan.,,227 The EPA, however, has awarded relatively few
grants under this statute, and by its own admission ''the agency has
made it difficult for local citizens or environmental groups to win these
grants because of unnecessary 'restrictions, complexity, costs, and red
tape. ",228 For instance, community groups must ordinarily supply
funds matching twenty percent of the total grant unless they obtain a
225. See STEJ Grants Program Request for Applications Guidance FY 1998, 63 Fed.
Reg. 13,666 (1998). The EPA also awards grants of up to $300,000 each to universities that
form partnerships with disadvantaged communities through its Community-University
Partnership Grants Program. See EPA, Office of Environmental Justice and the Office of
Civil Rights Solicitation Notice for Fiscal Year (FY) 1995; Environmental Justice
CommunitylUniversity Partnership Grants Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,281-14,282 (1995).
226. See EPA, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE AsSURANCE,
ENvIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND COMMUNITY TRACKING (EMPACT) GRANTS PROGRAM
(visited Nov. 22, 1998) <http://es.epagov/oecaloej/empact.htm1>.
227. Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 78; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e)(1997); 40
C.F.R. §§ 35.4000-35.4130 (1997). It is possible to seek a waiver of the $50,000 limit for an
initial grant, up to a $100,000 limit per site, but only if a cleanup is unusually complex. See
40 C.F.R. § 35.4090(a)(2); EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WA'fITE AND EMERGENCY REsPONSE,
SUPERFUND TEcHNICAL ASSISTANCE GRANT HANDBOOK: MANAGING YOUR GRANT 11-12
(1994) (EPA-K-93-006) [hereinafter EPA, MANAGING YOUR GRANT].
228. Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 78 (quoting 1989 Superfund Mgmt. Rev. at
5-16); accord 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAzARDous WA'fITES &
SUBSTANCES § 8.9.C.3, 617-18 n.133 (1992) (same); see also Ellison Folk, Public
Participation in the Superfund Cleanup Process, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 199 n.175 (1991)
(discussing restrictions on TAG grants); James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits
and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 159, 180 (1997)
("[O]our research indicates that minority communities are much less likely to receive
[Superfund technical assistance] grants than other communities.") (footnote omitted).
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waiver. 229 In addition, community organizations must meet a number
of administrative requirements, including being an incorporated
nonprofit organization, and file quarterly progress reports and yearly
financial reports. 230 The agency evaluates grant applications based on
a five criteria, weighted one hundred point scoring system, that
includes: (1) the site's risk (thirty points), (2) the applicant's ability to
represent the public (twenty points), (3) how the group plans to use its
proposed technical advisor (twenty points), (4) the ability of the
applicant to inform the public (twenty points), and (5) the economic or
environmental threat the site poses to group members (ten pointS).231
The agency does not give a lump sum grant to successful applicants,
but instead reimburses them for their actual expenses.232
The EPA has also proposed to provide up to $25,000 per project
for technical assistance to stakeholders involved in its Project XL
regulatory reform program.233 These grants must be paid directly to
the expert for specified assistance and may not be paid to individuals
or groups of stakeholders.234 The EPA's Project XL technical
assistance grant proposal offers inadequate grants and unduly restricts
in not alloWing community organizations to hire their own experts to
examine the safety of industry projects that propose to modify existing
environmental regulations to achieve greater efficiency.235
There are special reasons for providing technical assistance to
Title VI complainants because of the complexities of demonstrating
disparate impacts. These complexities include defining the relevant
area and "affected populations," the appropriate facilities, and the
amount and harmfulness of pollution involves complex scientific

229.. See 40 c.F.R. §§ 35.4085(a) (1997) (mandating 20% matching fund
requirement); id.. § 35.4090(b) (setting forth waiver provision); EPA, APPLYING FOR YOUR
GRANT, supra note 224, at 4-5.
230. See 40 C.F.R § 35.4020(b)(1997) (requiring that TAG recipient be incorporated
nonprofit organization); id. § 35.4110(a)-(b) (requiring quarterly progress and yearly financial
reports); EPA, APPLYING FOR YOUR GRANT, supra note 224, at 3-4 (requiring applicant to be
incorporated); EPA, MANAGING YOUR GRANT, supra note 229, at 7-8 (discussing quarterly
and annual report requirements).
231. See id. § 35.4035(a)-(5) (listing five criteria); Mank, Project XL, supra note 217,
at 78-79.
232. See 40 c.F.R. § 35.4080; Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 79.
. 233. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,881
(1997); Mank, Project XL, supra note 217, at 68, 77-79 (criticizing EPA proposal for
technical assistance grants for Project XL as inadequate).
234. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. at 19,881; Mank,
Project XL, supra note 217, at 68, 77-79.
235. See Mank,ProjectXL, supra note 217, at 68, 77-79.
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judgments?36 Therefore, the pennittee, the complainant, and the
recipient permitting agency will want their own experts to present their
side of how to interpret the facts of a case to EPA officials.
Even if the EPA's final Title VI interim guidance provides better
definitions than the Interim Guidance, it is important for all
participants in a Title VI environmental justice case to have access to
experts who can discuss with the agency different possible
interpretations of demographic and pollution data. While state or local
pennitting agencies and permit applicants may find it burdensome to
employ the necessary experts in a Title VI case, the hardship on
environmental justice complainants is likely to be even greater.
Although a simple letter is sufficient to file a Title VI complaint with
the EPA, a complainant may need technical experts to review the
agency's proposed findings about demographic and pollution data.
In the controversial Shintech case, which involved a proposal to
build a plastics factory in the heavily polluted and minority
community of Convent, Louisiana, the EPA struggled to define which
facilities and population groups should have been included in its
disparate impact analysis.237 The Louisiana environmental agency that
was the target of the Title VI complaint argued that the EPA should
have just studied the emissions resulting from the proposed Shintech
permit under challenge.238 According to the permit applicant, the
complainants, and the EPA itself, the census and pollution data used
by the agency in a draft report examining the Shintech proposal
contained significant errors, onnsslOns, and uncertainties.239
Furthermore, the agency could have reached a different result if it
examined population and pollution data from a one-mile radius around
the proposed site rather than a four-mile radius. Evaluating the risk of
a facility to surrounding populations was very difficult because
236. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 5, at 9-11; supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
237. See Hogue, Consider Only EmissiOns, supra note 128, at A-3 (discussing
comments of Bliss Higgins of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality).
Shintech just announced that it has abandoned the Convent site, but is proposing to build a
smaller facility in nearby Plaquemine. See Traci Watson, La. Town Successful in Stopping
Plastics Plant, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 1998, at 7A. The EPA is suspending its investigation
into the plant's impact, and may also suspend its Title VI investigation into Louisiana DEQ.
Seeid.
238. See note 237 and accompanying text.
239. See Bruce Alpert, TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 15, 1998, at Al (reporting that the EPA
found census data within one mile of proposed Shintech facility to be unreliable, and also had
difficulty measuring amount of pollution in four-mile area); Vicki Ferstel, Data for EPA s
Shin tech Decision Confusing at Best, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La), July 2, 1998, at 1B
(reporting that Shintech found that fewer people lived within one mile of site than EPA data
claimed).
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different assumptions about the size of the area that was "most
affected" and the hatmfulness of the pollutants can lead to
dramatically different results. 240
Because complainants often cannot afford to hire necessary
technical experts, the EPA ought to provide meaningful technical
assistance grants, perhaps up to $100,000 per complaint, to allow
complainants to thoroughly investigate a complainant once the EPA
concludes after a preliminary investigation that the complaillt raises
serious health issues. The primary problem with this proposal is
:finding the necessary funding. Ideally, the pennittee should pay to
provide the complainant with expert assistance. Pennittees, however,
would likely object to funding their opponents. The EPA could require
that recipients provide funding, but the agency might have to increase
its funding to recipients to enable them to provide such grants. As a
practical matter, the EPA will probably have to provide funding for
technical assistance grants. The political opposition to the Interim
Guidance, however, suggests that there may be substantial opposition
to any proposal that makes it easier for environmental justice groups to
file Title VI complaints that can stymie proposed industrial projects.
To overcome this opposition, it may be necessary to tie technical
assistance grants to proposals for more collaboration among industry,
recipients and the public?41
It would be better policy to allow the complainant to hire its own
expert so it has the flexibility to pursue various possible leads, rather
than adopt the EPA's Project XL requirement that the agency directly
pay the expert for narrowly tailored assistance. However, the latter
option would be better than no assistance at all. It is often hard to
predict in advance exactly what type of technical assistance is
available to investigate a complex case such as Shintech. Accordingly,
240. See generally Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 343 n.59, 390-92 &
n.373 (discussing how use of different definitions of subpopulations or geographical areas
can dramatically affect research results); Mohai, supra note 11, at 615 (same); Zimmerman,
supra note 11, at 665-69 (same).
241. See supra Part Y.BA. Industry and state or local officials would likely strongly
oppose EPA giving grants to Title VI complainants. In September 1998, the Detroit News
criticized the EPA for providing a $5,000 grant to a local community group, Flint-Genese
United for Action, because a closely associated group, St Francis Prayer Center, later filed a
Title VI complaint against a proposed steel plant in Flint, Michigan. EPA argued that the
grant was for development of a community demographic and pollution profile and did not
pay for the group to file the complaint See David Mastio, EPA Aided Mill Workers: Flint
Prayer Center Affiliated Gets $5,000 from Agency to Lobby Local Officials, DETROIT NEWS,
Sept. 23, 1998, at AI; EPA: Rogue Agency, DETROIT NEWS, Sept 24, 1998, at A8 (reporting
editorial criticizing EPA's actions). But see Letters: EPA Denies Bankrolling Flint
Complaint, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 8, 1998, at D8 (printing a Letter to the Editor by David A.
Ullrich, Acting Administrator, U.S. EPA Region V).
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direct grants to complainants would allow them more freedom to
select their experts and lines of inquiry.
Understandably, the EPA is nervous that a community
organization might misuse or waste a grant, and thus prefers a more
rigidly bureaucratic program where it closely monitors the exact work
that an expert performs. Even the EPA has recognized, however, that
its CERCLA TAG program has imposed too many complex rules on
applicants who lack the resources and technical sophistication to
anticipate every issue. Community groups should not need to hire an
expert to prepare a grant request for technical assistance.
The EPA must strike a balance between making sure technical
assistance grants are not wasted and using them to help community
organizations participate more effectively in challenging projects that a
preliminary investigation suggests are likely to cause disparate impacts
to minority and ethnic groups protected by Title VI. The EPA needs to
provide grants that are large enough to level the playing field to some
extent, so that community groups can challenge industry experts.
However, it is unlikely that community groups will even come close to
matching the resources of industry. In addition, the EPA needs to
allow enough flexibility in its TAG program to allow experts to pursue
promising areas of inquiry if significant new evidence emerges. In
theory, a group could submit a revised application to investigate
additional areas, but it is very cumbersome for grant applicants to file a
revised application every time new information suggests a slightly
different avenue of investigation. Instead, the EPA should provide
lump sum grants to qualified experts to pursue evidence that is
reasonably relevant to an ongoing Title VI investigation.
There are several ways the EPA can ensure that TAG funds are
not misused without adopting unduly restrictive rules. First, the EPA
could provide such grants only if its preliminary investigation found
probable cause that a violation has occurred. Second, the EPA could
require that any expert must take an agency training course and be
certified by the agency or another state or national accreditation board.
Third, the EPA could monitor the use of these funds. Fourth, the EPA
could require that it directly pay the expert and even choose the expert,
although that may reduce the complainant's freedom to investigate
promising leads. A technical assistance program for Title VI
complainants would allow them to bring effective challenges against
the permittee and recipient agency, which usually have far greater
resources.
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Providing the Public with a Reasonable Opportunity to Raise
Issues of Disparate Impacts

A recipient agency's pennitting process should provide the
public with a reasonable opportunity to raise claims of disparate
impacts. It could be argued that it is sufficient that the public may
file Title VI administrative complaints with the EPA even if the
recipient agency has no internal provisions for addressing disparate
impacts challenges. The EPA, however, has promulgated regulations
under section 602 of Title VI that prohibit recipient agencies from
engaging in practices creating discriminatory effects or locating a
facility where it will have discriminatory effects, including state
agencies granting environmental pennits.242 Furthermore, the EPA
regulations mandate that state recipients maintain Title VI
compliance programs addressing both discrimination by the state and
by any beneficiaries of state-administered funds. 243 If a state or local
recipient does not take at least some steps to provide the public with
a reasonable opportunity t~ raise claims of disparate impacts, the
recipient is arguably in violation of these provisions.
Both recipients and the,EPA have an interest in minimizing the
number of Title VI claims, becaUse the investigation of such
complaints is costly, time consuming, and often contentious. Several
state officials have testified before Congress that they would prefer to
resolve discrimination issues before minority individuals or groups file
Title VI complaints.z44 The EPA has recognized that reducing the
number of Title VI complaints is an important goal, and has
specifically asked the' agency's advisory committee on implementing
Title VI to recommend changes in state or local pennitting practices to
resolve problems befo:re they become the subject of complaints.z45
242. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997) (prohibiting use of discriminatory program
criteria); id. § 7.35.(c) (prohibiting location offacility that has discriminatory effect).
243. See 28 c.F.R. § 42.410 (1998).
244. See Hogue, Permits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9.
245. See Environmental Justice: New EPA Advisory Committee to Address Rights
Concerns on State, Local Permitting, 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2441 (1998); Pollution in
Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations, 105th Cong., (Aug. 6, 1998), available in 1998 WL 12763021
(testimony of Michael Hogan, New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection, stating that
New Jersey is adopting "an inclusive collaborative process to address issues of environmental
equity" and an "upfrontlproactive environmental equity process" that allows local minority
and low-income communities to have "input into the permitting process when it is most
meaningful, before the permit is issued"); Pollution in Minority and Inner-City
Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
105th Cong., (Aug. 6, 1998), available in 1998 WL 12763097 (testimony of Barry McBee,
Chairman of Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) (noting that Texas seeks to
provide citizens with opportunity for early, meaningful input into permitting process).
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A recipient is much more likely to avoid Title VI complaints if it
requires community involvement and public participation early in the
permitting process?46 New Jersey and Texas state officials have
testified before Congress that they have already created ''three-legged''
networks of government, business and minority communities to
discuss the racial implications of siting decisions, and that they want to
further develop these ''up-fronf' processes to avoid discrimination
problems?47 These state officials want the EPA to approve such prelicensing procedures so there would be a shield, or at least a
presumption, that any Title VI complaint lacked substance if the state
follows the approved process, rather than have the EPA conduct
lengthy post-licensing reviews, as in the Shintech case?48 The
Environmental Council of States, representing forty-nine states and the
District of Columbia, has created a working group to develop such
principles, and the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection has similar plans?49 The more a recipient's permitting
process parallels the EPNs Title VI criteria, the more likely a recipient
will avoid engaging in discrimination that violates the EPNs section
602 regulations.
Even if a state develops procedures to encourage public
participation in the permitting process, there may still be serious
questions about whether that process adequately addresses those most
at risk, particularly vulnerable minority groups. Existing processes for
creating community advisory boards for siting or permitting decisions
often fail to guarantee that those at greatest risk will have
representation?50 There are possible solutions, such as granting more
votes to those at greater risk, adopting cumulative or proportional
voting schemes that allow all minority voters to cumulate their votes,
or ranking candidates in preference to increase the odds of minority

246. See Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9.
247. See id. at A-9; Joan McKinney, Congressmen Want New Siting Rules, ADVOCATE

(Baton Rouge, La), Aug. 9,1998, at 17B.
248. See Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9; McKinney,
supra note 247, at 17B.
249. See Hogue, Pennits Have Remained Valid, supra note 44, at A-9. The
Environmental Council of States has drafted an envirorupental justice principles paper which
it will submit to state officials for a vote in October, 1998. See State Officials Draft New
Alternatives to EPA Environmental Justice Policy, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Aug. 26, 1998, at
30.
250. See Foster, Justicefrom the Ground Up, supra note 220, at 834-37 (arguing that
citizen advisory committees may not adequately represent minorities); Mank, Environmental
Justice, supra note 9, at 410-19 (arguing that community siting compensation committees
may not adequately represent minorities or high-risk residents).
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representation. 251 The EPA or the recipient could use technical
assistance grants to educate minority or high-risk residents about a
project and, accordingly, increase the odds that members of such
Several federal agencies in their
groups will participate.
environmental justice strategies have established programs to educate
the public, to reach minority groups that may not traditionally
participate in agency permitting decisions, to translate documents in
languages other than English where appropriate, and to write their
environmental documents in plain language that is accessible to the
general public.252 The EPA should strongly encourage recipients to
adopt similar programs.
If a state adopts effective and meaningful procedures
encouraging early participation, the EPA should take such
participation into account when reviewing a Title VI complaint. If a
complainant participated in such a process, but did not raise an issue or
present an alternative at that time, the complainant has a weaker claim
that the recipient acted unreasonably. To insure effective participation,
however, the EPA or recipients should provide technical assistance,
and hopefully TAG grants, to community organizations early in the
permitting process to identify problems before significant resources
are invested in a site. In particular, any state process should examine
whether less discriminatory alternatives exist.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The EPA's regulations provide few rights for complainants, but
many protections to recipients that the agency finds have engaged in
discriminatory practices. Also, there are substantial differences
between Title VI's regulation of recipients who voluntarily accept
federal aid and Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory actions by
private employers. Accordingly, the EPA should not follow the
burden of proof or affinnative defenses that apply to employment
discrimination issues. Because recipients generally posses greater
expertise and resources than complainants, it is appropriate to place a
greater burden on recipients to justify their permit decisions.
Recipients should bear the burden of establishing that no less
discriminatory alternatives exist that can meet the applicant's
251. See ManIc, Environmental Justice, supra note 9, at 412-14 (proposing cumulative
voting or Hare Single Transferable Vote proportional voting systems as ways to increase
representation of minorities or high-risk residents on community siting compensation
committees).
252. See Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-200-R-95-002, ENvIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE STRATEGY (1995); Mank, Executive Order 12,898, supra note 22.
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legitimate objectives, that they will actually. implement proposed
mitigation measures, and that no mitigation techniques exist that
would allow a less discriminatory alternative to satisfy the
applicant's genuine goals. Furthennore, the EPA or recipients should
level the playing field by providing technical assistance and grants to
Title VI complainants. Finally, recipients should adopt procedures
encouraging early participation by affected populations, particularly
minority groups, to avoid controversies that lead to Title VI
challenges. If a recipient has effective procedures for public
participation by a diverse group of citizens and provides reasonable
technical assistance to such groups, the EPA should usually defer to
its pennitting decisions.
With these changes, state and local pennitting agencies and
pennit applicants will finally have a strong incentive to avoid locating
polluting facilities in minority areas if reasonably effective less
discriminatory alternatives exist. These changes, however, should not
discourage legitimate development projects that add significant
economic value to minority communities. The proposed changes
strike a reasonable balance between preventing disparate impacts that
unduly hann minority communities and allowing development in
impoverished minority areas. Developers can use effective mitigation
measures and the promise of significant economic benefits to win
approval for beneficial economic development projects in minority
areas.
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